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I.  INTRODUCTION
In  the  last decade,  the  theory  and  practice  of environmental
protection  have  begun  to  incorporate  principles  of economics.
New  initiatives have attempted  to protect natural resources while
promoting economic development or at least minimizing adverse
economic  effects.  Indeed,  a  staple  of the  recent  movement  for
environmental  reform has been attention to the costs and the un-
intended  perverse  effects  of environmental  regulation.  It  has
been  shown, for example,  that centralized  command-and-control
regulation  can  discourage  innovation  in  pollution  control,  in-
crease  rather than decrease pollution levels,  freeze existing tech-
nology,  and  produce  serious  inefficiencies  in  the  form  of
unnecessarily  high costs.'
Understandings  of this sort have  led environmental  reformers
close to the principle of Pareto superiority, encompassed in strat-
egies  that  can  make  people  better  off without  making  anyone
worse off,2 or at least anyone  who has  a basis  for legitimate com-
plaint.  Thus, for example,  systems in which polluters pay for the
harms they  cause, and are permitted  to purchase and sell the re-
sulting  permits,  are  preferable  to  the  currently  pervasive  "best
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**  Karl  N.  Llewellyn  Professor ofJurisprudence,  Law School and Department  of Polit-
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Anne-Marie  Burley, Abram Chayes,  Martin Loesch, John H.  Robinson, and Craig Scott for
helpful  comments  and suggestions.
1.  See Ralph  Turvey, On Divergence Between the Social Costs and Private  Costs, in ECONOMICS
OF THE  ENVIRONMENT  187-91  (Robert Dorfman & Nancy  S. Dorfman eds.,  1977); Allen V.
Kneese  & Blair T. Bower, Standards, Changes and Equity, in  ECONOMICS  OF  THE  ENVIRON-
MENT,  supra, at 217-28;  Bruce  A.  Ackerman  & Richard B.  Stewart, Reforming Environmental
Law:  The Democratic Case for Market Incentives,  13  COLUM.  J.  ENVTL.  L.  171  (1988).
2.  See  RICHARD  A.  POSNER,  ECONOMIC  ANALYSIS  OF  LAw  12-14 (1986).94  COLUMBIA  JOURNAL  OF  ENVIRONMENTAL  LAW  [Vol.  17:93
available  technology"  requirements  along every possible  dimen-
sion of social welfare.3  The general use of the principle that "pol-
luters  pay,"  combined  with other decentralized,  incentive-based
strategies, holds out far more promise for environmental  reform
than the technology-based  strategies  of the  last two decades.
Similar debates have  begun to arise in the international arena,
which  promises to be the focal point for environmental  policy  in
the next generation.  Some people have suggested, for example,
that  the  greenhouse  effect4  and  the  destruction  of the  ozone
layer 5  might  be controlled  through  the imposition,  by treaty,  of
uniform technological  requirements  on sources  of environmental
pollutants,  or of strict  emissions -limits laid  down  in advance  by
some  international  body.6  Protection  of  endangered  species
might involve the adoption by'all nations of uniform measures for
controlling  action  threatening  to endangered  populations. 7  In-
deed, there has been considerable movement  in these directions,
as  nations  start  to  develop  coordinated  strategies  for  handling
what are,  after all,  global problems.8
I  At  first  glance  there  seems  much to  be said  on behalf of uni-
form  strategies  for  handling  international  environmental
problems.  Since  such  strategies  appear  to  treat everyone  alike,
they seem to have the important virtues of ease of application and
3.  See Ackerman  &  Stewart,  supra note  1, at  172.
4.  This phenomenon,  sometimes described as global warming, is produced by accumu-
lation of carbon dioxide and other gases in the atmosphere.  See JOHN  FIROR,  THE  CHANG-
ING  ATMOSPHERE:  A  GLOBAL  CHALLENGE  49-55  (1990);  MICHAEL  OPPENHEIMER  &  ROBERT
H.  BOYLE,  DEAD  HEAT:  THE  RACE  AGAINST THE  GREENHOUSE  EFFECT  22-33  (1989).
5.  This  phenomenon  is  produced  mostly  by  chemicals  called  chlorofluorocarbons
("CFCs").  See  FIROR,  supra note 4,  at 26-43.
6.  International efforts  and  proposals  to date have generally  favored uniform  require-
ments.  See, e.g.,  Montreal  Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept.  16,
1987,  26 I.L.M.  1550 (entered  into force Jan.  1, 1989)  (calling for phasing  out CFC  pro-
duction).  Some international agreements, however, are beginning to make some provision
for the situation of  developing countries, by permitting at least a longer time period within
which  those countries must meet  specific levels or standards.  See,  e.g.,  id. art.  5, 26 I.L.M.
at  1555-56.
7.  See,  e.g.,  Convention on  International Trade  in Endangered  Species of Wild  Fauna
and  Flora, Mar.  3,  1973,  27  U.S.T.  1087  (entered into forceJuly  1,  1975).
8.  See generally Hilary F.  French, Strengthening  Global Environmental Governance, in STATE  OF
THE  WORLD  1992,  at  155  (Lester R. Brown ed.,  Worldwatch Institute  1992).  See  also the
discussion  of efforts  toward  worldwide  reduction  targets  for  carbon dioxide, in UNCED
Meeting, Ozone-Depleting Substances  Top  Environmental Agenda for  1992,  15  Int'l  Envtl.  Rep.
(BNA) 54  (Jan.  29, 1992).  Negotiations are currently underway for proposed international
agreements  on  forestry,  biodiversity, and  climate  change,  in  conjunction with  the June
1992  United  Nations  Conference on Environment  and Development.Economics  and the  Environment
general  equity.  But  there  are  enormous  disparities  among  na-
tions in terms of standard of living, patterns of consumption, and
past  contribution  to present  problems.  Differences  exist as  well
in  natural resource endowments,  in technological  capacities,  and
in  social  and cultural values.
In view of these differences,  international solutions that impose
uniform obligations are both inefficient and unjust.  Uniform reg-
ulations are likely to impose costs far in excess of those necessary
to achieve the relevant goals and even  to frustrate achievement of
these goals. 9  Such regulations also confer disproportionate bene-
fits on nations that have gained from their existing contributions
to current  problems,  and they  impose disproportionate  burdens
on nations that have the least to lose from increased environmen-
tal  degradation.  It  should  be  unsurprising  that  poor  countries
have been especially reluctant to enter into agreements  that seem
to  intrude  on their  sovereignty  while imposing  costs  that  dwarf
the potential benefits.' 0
In  both  developing  and  industrialized  nations,  any  strategy
designed  to  address  global  environmental  problems  must  at the
same time confront the issues of poverty and economic  develop-
ment, which often seem to make environmental  protection  a lux-
ury that most nations cannot afford.  Until recently,  these tandem
concerns  have  been  compartmentalized  and  considered  sepa-
rately  by agencies  and  institutions  charged  with  one  mission  or
the other."  There is an emerging  consensus  that recognition of
9.  See Ackerman  & Stewart, supra note  1, at  173-75; Cass R.  Sunstein, Administrative Sub-
stance,  1991  DUKE  L.J.  607, 627-31.
10.  See French, supra note  8, at  160-61  (noting that the fund to help developing coun-
tries make  the transition to CFC  substitutes was  central to treaty on ozone depletion, the
Montreal Protocol).
11.  In the  mid-1980s,  some  international development  institutions were instructed to
consider the environmental impact of the decisions they  made within their discrete area of
competence.  But environmental and  economic concerns were  still largely treated  as dis-
tinct.  Initiatives by  international environmental entities, too, have only recently begun to
reflect the connection between the issues of environment and development.  In May,  1987,
for example, the President of the World Bank announced that the World Bank would ad-
dress  the  environmental  aspects of development  projects.  Shortly thereafter, the  World
Bank undertook internal restructuring, including the creation of a  central Environmental
Department,  designed  to increase the integration  of environmental  considerations in all
stages of project financing.  More  recently, the World Bank has indicated that environmen-
tal impact assessment statements will become a standard requirement of project proposals.
See generally Darryl Joannides,  Note,  Restructuring the  World Bank:  The  Environmental Light
Shines on  the Funding of Development Projects, 2  GEO.  INT'L ENVTL.  L.  REV.  161  (1989).  More-
over,  governmental  development  assistance  efforts  have  recently strengthened  their re-
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the  global  nature  of environmental  problems  necessarily  entails
recognition  of the  global nature  of the  problems of poverty  and
development.12  While this theoretical consensus  is important, in-
ternational policy has yet to reflect the interrelation between envi-
ronment  and  development.  The  challenge  for  international
cooperative  efforts  is to put this  recognition into  practice.
The rallying cry of "sustainability"' 3  is a shorthand description
of the need  to integrate  considerations  of environmental  quality
and  economic  development.  The  underlying  goal  of  sus-
tainability is Paretian in character: the simultaneous improvement
of the welfare of multiple groups and interests, including those of
future  generations.
Nowhere  is  there  a  greater  need  to  adopt  sustainability  and
Paretianism as  guiding maxims for policy than for those environ-
mental issues that involve the interests of both developed and de-
veloping countries.  It is  clear that countries  of the Third World
must be free to pursue  development  and improve  prospects  for
economic health and self-determination.  In order to reduce pov-
erty and unemployment,  and to eliminate  the large international
debt burden under  which many  developing  countries  now  oper-
ate,  new  productive  arrangements  are  indispensable.  Equally
clear, however, is the need for growth to be undertaken in an eco-
logically prudent manner, that is,  in a manner appreciative of the
fact that neither economic  nor environmental  health can be real-
ized in isolation.
quirement  of  environmental  impact  assessments.  See  WORLD  RESOURCES  INSTITUTE,
NATURAL  ENDOWMENTS:  FINANCING  RESOURCE  CONSERVATION  FOR  DEVELOPMENT  §  2.1,  at
5-6 (International Conservation  Financing Project Report  1989) [hereinafter  NATURAL EN-
DOWMENTS].
Development assistance  agencies rely primarily upon economists and  engineers for pro-
ject preparation.  In  the past environmental  concerns often  received attention  as an after-
thought.  See  id.  at  6.  Thus,  despite  international  policy  guidelines,  "[tihere  is  still  a
potentially dangerous  tendency within many of these institutions to compartmentalize en-
vironmental  issues, and,  in effect,  treat them as  peripheral  to crucial  macroeconomic  ad-
justment  issues when,  in  many developing  countries, they  are indeed central."  Id.  at  21.
12.  Consider, for  example, the embodiment  of this  recognition  through  the inclusion,
in  1992, of development among the  aims of the United  Nations  Conference on  Environ-
ment and  Development;  its predecessor,  the United  Nations  Conference  on  the Human
Environment,  declined  to  take  this  step in  1972.  See  infra note  171.  See  aso H. Jeffrey
Leonard & David  Morell, Emergence of Environmental Concern in Developing Countries:  A  Political
Perspective, 17  STAN.  J.  INT'L L. 281  (1981).
13.  See  WORLD COMMISSION  ON  ENVIRONMENT  AND  DEVELOPMENT,  OUR COMMON  FUTURE
8-9 (1987);  LESTER  R. BROWN,  BUILDING  A SUSTAINABLE  SOCIETY  (1981).Economics  and  the Environment
Ecological  prudence  did not, of course,  characterize  the meth-
ods  by  which  developed  nations  achieved  economic  growth and
prominence  during the industrial  revolution;  nor does  it charac-
terize  the consumption  patterns  of most of the developed  world
today.  It is a hard question whether and to what extent the indus-
trialized  nations are now obligated to their less-developed  coun-
terparts for having produced global  environmental  degradation,
but it  is  clear  that in  their future  development,  all  nations  must
avoid repeating  the mistakes  of the past.
In  recent  years,  the  "debt-for-nature"  swap  has  become  a
prominent  strategy  for  solving  environmental  problems  within
the frameworks  of sustainability and Paretianism.  Broadly  speak-
ing, debt-for-nature  swaps  are designed  to stem the exploitation
of natural resources  in developing  nations without ignoring  eco-
nomic  needs  in  those  nations.14  Their  chief virtue  is  that  they
confer  economic  benefits  while promoting  environmental  goals.
But it  is  necessary  to develop more ambitious  arrangements  for
achieving  environmental  quality and economic  growth.
In  this Article  we  have  two  goals.  The  first  is  to explore  and
suggest improvements  in current debt-for-nature  swaps, with the
ultimate  aim  of defending  the  use  of economic  incentives  and
Paretian  principles  in the  context of international  environmental
policy.  The  second  is  to examine some  of the limitations of the
exchange  of debt  for nature, and  thus  to  suggest  an alternative
exchange that overcomes those limitations.  The exchange we en-
vision is quite simple. Developed  nations would  transfer 15 to de-
veloping  nations  environmentally  advanced  technologies,
particularly technologies designed to increase efficient energy use
or  to replace  non-renewable  sources  with  renewable  sources  of
energy.  In return, developing  nations  would agree to provide  a
measure of environmental  protection.
14.  A  generic formulation  requires  this level of generality. As  will be discussed, a broad
spectrum of arrangements  have been or could be fashioned.  In  particular, the vagueness
of the phrase "without ignoring their economic needs"  is warranted because some arrange-
ments  merely  refrain  from  exacerbating  the  underdeveloped  condition  of the  nation's
economy while  others could actually advance,  to varying degrees, the development of the
nation.
15.  The term  "transfer"  is  employed  loosely  to  refer  to  a  number  of arrangements,
ranging from donation  to cooperation,  the best among which  would be those that involve
joint research efforts enhancing  the developing nation's  capacity  to conduct independent
research and achieve  technical self-reliance.
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In Part II of this Article,  we outline the concerns, both ecologi-
cal  and  economic,  that  lead  to  the  creation  of debt-for-nature
swaps.  In Part III, after detailing the mechanics of such swaps,  we
discuss various objections to these exchanges  and examine poten-
tial limitations on their usefulness.  In Part IV, we discuss the cur-
rent possibilities  for the  implementation  of technologies  for the
efficient  use  of energy  and  for  the  development  of renewable
sources  of energy.  We then  propose an  exchange of such  tech-
nologies for nature and note several considerations  that will bear
upon the  structuring  of such trades.
We conclude  that trades of energy technology  for nature have
significant  advantages  over  debt-for-nature  swaps.  Trades  that
involve technology  hold out the best long-term promise for help-
ing both  developing  and industrialized  nations  to  promote  eco-
nomic  development,  to  protect  the  environment,  and  to  bring
about an equitable international sharing of the burdens imposed
by both of these  imperatives.
II.  PROBLEMS  GIVING  RISE  TO  DEBT-FOR-NATURE  SWAPS
We  begin  by  describing  the  pressures  that  have  made  ex-
changes  of debt for nature so attractive  to a seemingly disparate
array of parties.  These pressures include extreme stresses on the
natural  resources  of developing  countries  - stresses  that have
created environmental risks for those countries  and for the world
as a whole  - and mounting international debt.
A.  Environmental Concerns
The  immediate  need  for  economic  progress  in  developing
countries  has led  to severe  environmental  degradation.  A major
problem  is  deforestation.  The razing of the world's  rain  forests
continues  at an alarming rate.  In  1990  alone, seventeen  million
hectares  of tropical  forest  were  destroyed.' 6  Only  half  of  the
world's mature  tropical forests  still exist.
17
Eighty percent of the forests of the Philippine archipelago have
been destroyed; Haiti, India, Sri Lanka, El Salvador, Ghana, Nige-
ria, and Bangladesh have lost all or nearly all of their primary rain
16.  John C. Ryan, Conserving Biological Diversity, in STATE  OF THE WORLD  1992, supra note
8, at  9,  10.
17.  GEOFFREY  LEAN  ET  AL.,  ATLAS  OF THE  ENVIRONMENT  65  (1990).Economics  and  the  Environment
forest; Honduras will have lost more than half by the year 2000.18
Latin America  has  lost thirty-seven  percent of its  tropical forests
and Africa has lost  fifty-two  percent.' 9  If the current rate of net
deforestation  persists,  the world will lose an  area more than half
the size of the continental  United States by  the year 2030,20  and
tropical forests  will be virtually eliminated within the next eighty-
five years.
2'
Many  developing  country  governments  have  actively  en-
couraged  colonization  of rain  forests  to relieve  population  pres-
sures, distribute land to the poor, and promote development.  A
particularly revealing example is  the policy of the Amazonas gov-
ernment  to  issue  free  chain  saws  to  colonizers. 22  Expenditure
and taxing policies have encouraged deforestation  in the Amazon
region and elsewhere  in the developing world.23  An estimated $1
billion worth of timber was  burned  in the Brazilian  Amazon  in a
single  year,  in  part  stimulated  by  government  policies  such  as
subsidizing cattle ranches.24
The environmental consequences of deforestation are complex,
but there  can be no doubt that the consequences  are potentially
great.  Some  of these effects  are  immediately  observable;  others
depend  upon  poorly  understood  ecological,  geographical,  and
temporal interrelationships.  It is clear, for example, that defores-
tation  threatens  genetic  diversity.  The  rain  forests  are  an  ex-
traordinary  source  of species  of animals  and plants,  holding  at
18.  d.  at 65-67.
19.  Id. at 65.
20.  See Lester R. Brown et al., Picturing  a Sustainable  Society, in STATE  OF THE  WORLD  1990,
at  173,  184  (Lester R.  Brown  ed.,  Worldwatch  Institute  1990).
21.  JOSE  GOLDEMBERG  ET  AL.,  ENERGY  FOR  A SUSTAINABLE  WORLD 40  (1988).
22.  See Michel Bird, But  Will Amazon Jungle Survive the Onslaught,  TORONTO  GLOBE & MAIL,
Nov.  15,  1989,  at A7.
23.  See generally MALCOLM  GILLIS  & ROBERT  REPETrO,  DEFORESTATION AND  GOVERNMENT
POLICY  (1988).
24.  See  NATURAL  ENDOWMENTS,  supra note  11,  at  18 n.26.  See also WORLD  BANK,  WORLD*
DEVELOPMENT  REPORT  1990, at 59,  Box 4.1  (1990)  [hereinafter WORLD  DEVELOPMENT  RE-
PORT  1990].  Note  that new  governmental  policies  have  in  turn  played  a  major role  in
lowering the rate of destruction of the rain forest in Brazil. The recent elimination of most
of the tax credits encouraging deforestation has contributed to the decline in deforestation
in  the  Brazilian  Amazon from  8  million hectares  in  1987  to  3 million  hectares  in  1989.
Although the  1989 figure  may be explained  in part by the unusual amount of rainfall dur-
ing the  dry  season  (during which most  of the burning  takes  place)  and by increased  en-
forcement efforts against illegal burning, the dismantling of financial incentives appears  to
have  contributed  significantly  to  the fairly  rapid  change  in  trends.  See Sandra  Postel  &
Christopher Flavin, Reshaping the Global Economy, in STATE  OF THE WORLD  1991,  at  178 (Les-
ter R.  Brown ed.,  Worldwatch  Institute  1991).
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least half of the earth's species despite occupying  only six percent
of its  land area. 25  A  single  volcano  in  the  Philippines  has  more
kinds of woody plants  than all of the United States. 26  Elimination
of species  may in turn have a variety of harmful effects,  including
the  reduction  of  available  genetic  stock  for  development  of
medicines and wild strains  that reduce plant disease.  The medici-
nal and agricultural losses could  be both enormous and irrevers-
ible.  This is  a  concern quite independent  of the possible  ethical
obligation of one species not to produce wholesale extinctions  of
others,  or  to  contribute  to  massive  deaths  of  other  living
creatures.
Deforestation  contributes to the problem  of climate  change in
several ways.  The most obvious impact, caused by the very act of
felling and burning trees, is the release of carbon directly into the
atmosphere.  Recent estimates attribute the release of one to  two
billion tons of carbon per year to deforestation.2 7  By comparison,
in  1988,  the combustion  of fossil fuels released  5.66 billion tons
of carbon into the atmosphere. 28  Although developing countries
use  fossil fuels  at a  much  lower rate  than do their industrialized
counterparts,  their contribution  to the world's  total carbon emis-
sions is significant.  Deforestation  in Brazil alone accounts  for the
release of 336 million  tons of carbon  annually.29  This  amount  is
nearly  six  times  its  contribution  of carbon  from  fossil  fuel  com-
bustion.  The combination of these  two sources,  however,  makes
Brazil the fourth largest carbon emitter in the world.30  Deforesta-
tion  also accounts  for Indonesia's  and  Colombia's  place  among
the world's ten largest carbon emitters. 3 l
In addition to the direct release of carbon into the atmosphere,
large-scale  deforestation  contributes  to  perturbations  in  the
global  carbon cycle  and ultimately to  the risk of climate  change.
Destruction of trees  eliminates a  major source  of carbon  uptake,
because  trees  act as a  natural  "sink"  that absorbs  carbon  rather
25.  Edward 0.  Wilson,  Threats to Biodiversity, in MANAGING  PLANET EARTH  49, 51  (1990).
26.  LEAN  ET  AL.,  supra note  17, at 68.
27.  See Christopher Flavin, Slowing Global Warming, in STATE  OF  THE  WORLD  1990, supra
note 20,  at  17,  18.
28.  Id. at  18.
29.  Id. at 20-21  & Table 2-2.
30.  Id. at 20-21.
31.  Id.Economics  and  the Environment
than  allowing  it  to  move  into  the  atmosphere.32  Other  distur-
bances,  more difficult to quantify,  also result from deforestation.
Changes  in  terrain reflectivity  after forests have  been cleared af-
fect the hydrological  cycle,  producing variations  in precipitation,
evaporation,  and runoff. These changes  may  in turn have effects
on atmospheric  circulation  and climate.3"
The destruction  of protective  forest cover also  threatens  to in-
crease  soil erosion, undermining  the capacity  of the land to sup-
port agricultural  and other productive uses.  As a consequence  of
deforestation  and  the  resulting  soil  erosion,  an  estimated  one-
tenth of the world's crop lands - an area equivalent to the size of
the United States - can no longer sustain cultivation.3 4  In addi-
tion, increased runoff clogs water systems with silt, and produces
flooding in  some areas. s 5  Soil erosion  may lead,  in the extreme,
to  desertification.  According  to  United  Nations  Environment
Programme  estimates,  worldwide  losses  in  agricultural  produc-
tion from desertification  total $26 billion  per year.36
Deforestation  is  hardly  the  only  relevant  environmental  con-
cern for developing  nations.  Economic  development  in  such na-
tions depends in large part on the use of energy, and much of the
global  increase  in  energy  use  will  come  from  this  part  of the
world.3 7  If developing countries need and use the energy sources
characteristic  of industrialized  nations, the environmental  conse-
quences  will be enormous.38  Carbon dioxide emissions from de-
veloping countries are currently increasing at a rate of six percent
per year.  By  contrast, in Western Europe and North America, the
32.  See  INTERGOVERNMENTAL  PANEL  ON  CLIMATE  CHANGE,  CLIMATE  CHANGE:  THE IPCC
SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT  7-18 (J.T.  Houghton et al. eds.,  1990) (technical discussion of car-
bon flux, the  effects of various  carbon emissions on  the carbon cycle,  and their contribu-
tion to the risk of climate  change) [hereinafter  IPCC  REPORT].
33.  Id. at xxxii.
34.  Lester  R.  Brown  & Edward  C.  Wolf, Reclaiming the Future, in STATE  OF THE  WORLD
1988, at  170,  174  (Lester  R.  Brown  ed., Worldwatch  Institute  1988).
35.  GOLDEMBERG  ET AL., supra note 21,  at 40.
36.  See  NATURAL  ENDOWMENTS,  supra note  11,  at  2 (citing YUSUF  J.  AHMAD  &  MOHAMED
KAsSAS,  DESERTIFICATION:  FINANCIAL  SUPPORT  FOR THE  BIOSPHERE  (1987)).
37.  See Christopher Flavin, Building  a Bridge to Sustainable Energy, in STATE  OF THE WORLD
1992,  supra note 8,  at  27,  30.
38.  The consumption  pattern of the industrialized world, which accounts for 1 of global
energy use, is carbon intensive. See  GOLDEMBERG  ET  AL.,  supra note 21,  at 22.  In Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development  ("OECD") countries in 1989, for exam-
ple,  fossil  fuels  contributed  84.5%  to  total  primary  energy  consumption.  Calculation
based  on  BRrIsSH  PETROLEUM  COMPANY,  BP STATISTICAL  REVIEW  OF  WORLD  ENERGY  34
(June  1990).
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rate of increase of carbon dioxide emissions fell from about three
percent per year in the period  1945 to  1972, to less than one per-
cent per year in the period  1973 to  1984. 39  By 2010, the develop-
ing  world  might  well  account  for  half  of  the  world's  carbon
emissions .40
In absolute  terms,  fossil  fuel  combustion  still  occurs  in  rela-
tively  small  amounts  in  developing  countries,  but  it  is  increas-
ing.41  China  is  now  the  world's  third  largest  source  of carbon
emissions, and it will soon surpass the status of the former Soviet
Union.42  Even  if developing  countries  sought only to engage  in
existing  carbon-emitting  activities,  their  growing  populations
would require substantial increases in the amount of carbon emit-
ted.43  Efforts to achieve economic growth have typically required
increased  energy consumption,  and thus greater levels of carbon
emissions.44  The combustion of fossil fuels contributes  not only
to the greenhouse effect, but also  to a wide  range of other pollu-
tion problems,  including  acid  deposition,  which  damages  crops
and forests.
While  this  description of environmental  problems  in develop-
ing countries  is  incomplete, it helps  explain  why debt-for-nature
exchanges  might  be  attractive  to  developing  and  industrialized
countries  alike.  We  now turn to  the economic  concerns  that  lie
behind  these exchanges.
39.  IPCC REPORT, supra note 32,  at  10.  For further discussion  of the interaction  of nu-
merous  national  and global events  explaining the  trends  in industrialized  country emis-
sions, see  Flavin, supra note 27,  at  20. For a  description of the factors accounting  for the
increasing rate of carbon dioxide emissions in developing countries,  see id. at 20-2 1; IPCC
REPORT, supra note  32,  at  10-11.  Particularly  troubling  is the suggestion  that the rate of
growth  of fossil  fuel  use  in developing  countries  has  been  constrained  in  large part  by
economic problems such as the debt crisis. If this is so, dramatic increases in fossil fuel use
might be expected  to ensue upon solution of these problems.  Flavin, supra note 27, at 20.
40.  Flavin,  supra note 37,  at  30.
41.  See Flavin, supra note  27, at 20;  GOLDEMBERG  ET  AL.,  supra note 21,  at  191  (noting
that the  70%  of humanity  living  in developing  countries  accounts  for  less  than  20% of
world fossil  fuel  consumption).
42.  Flavin, supra note 37,  at  30.
43.  The average  woman in industrialized nations bears two  children, whereas her coun-
terpart in the  Middle East and Africa  has  between  six  and eight.  The result  is that  more
than 90% of the world's population growth is occurring in the developing world.  LEAN  ET
AL.,  supra note  17,  at  17.
44.  Recent  development  efforts  in  such  rapidly  expanding  economies  as South  Korea
have relied heavily upon an increased  use of fossil fuels, lending credence  to concerns  that
economic development  will be pursued along environmentally  threatening  lines.  See Fla-
vin, supra note 27,  at 20.Economics  and  the Environment
B.  Economic Concerns
Less developed nations  face the general challenge of economic
growth.  One of the most difficult aspects of the quest for growth
is  the  continuing  accumulation  of foreign  debt. The  cumulative
foreign  debt  of developing  countries  was  estimated  to  be $1.34
trillion in  1990, and it is increasing.45  While the amount owed by
the  severely  indebted  low-income  countries  is  not,  in  absolute
terms,  as great  as that owed  by  the severely indebted middle-in-
come countries,  the burden on the economies of the low-income
countries  is  especially  serious.46  As  one indicator of this  stress,
the ratio of debt to gross national  product was recently  111 % for
the  low-income  countries. 47  Debt service  exacts  a heavy  toll  on
the  economies  of debtor  nations.48  In  1988,  interest  payments
alone on long-term foreign debt amounted to $60 billion.49  Since
1982,  Latin American countries  have sent a net total of $220 bil-
lion in capital to creditor nations.  Most of that money consists of
payments  of principal and interest on foreign debt.50  Despite the
payment by developing countries of billions of dollars in principal
and interest by the year 1988,51  the debt has continued to mount,
totalling  $1.3  trillion in  1991.52
Because of the debt problem, the traditional net flow of capital
from  industrialized  to developing  nations  was reversed  in  1982,
and  transfers  in  the other direction are  steadily  increasing.53  In
45.  See Melvyn Westlake,  Recession Puts the Brakes on Recovery,  THE  GUARDIAN  (int'l ed.),
Feb. 4,  1991,  at  12  (discussing the continuing increase in the cumulative debt burden  and
the recent  reversal of progress  made since 1988)  [hereinafter  Westlake I].
46.  The foreign  debt of the 26  severely indebted low-income countries, the majority of
which are in sub-Saharan Africa, is $116 billion.  The foreign debt owed by the 20  severely
indebted middle-income countries, the bulk of which  comprise Latin America,  is $590 bil-
lion.  The remainder  of the  $1.34  trillion figure is  accounted  for by  countries  with less
acute debt problems.  Id.; Melvyn Westlake,  The Continent that Suffers in Silence, THE  GUARD-
IAN  (int'l ed.),  Feb.  5,  1991,  at  13  [hereinafter Westlake  II].
47.  WORLD  DEVELOPMENT  REPORT  1990, supra note 24,  at  126.
48.  See id. at 222-23, Table 23 (conventional indicators of the ability of developing coun-
tries to  support  the  burdens of servicing  their debt,  expressed  both  as  a  ratio of debt
service to exports  and as a  ratio of debt service to GNP).
49.  Calculation of this figure based on id.
50.  See Westlake I, supra note 45,  at  12.
51.  See  WORLD  DEVELOPMENT  REPORT  1990,  supra note  24,  at 222-23,  Table 23.
52.  WORLD  BANK,  WORLD  DEVELOPMENT  REPORT  1991,  at 24  (1991).
53.  For a discussion  of the  history of the  debt crisis,  see  Christine A. Bogdanowicz-
Bindert & Richard E.  Feinberg, Third  World Debt:  An Analysis (Feb.  1988)  (unpublished
paper,  available  from  the  World  Wildlife  Fund,  Washington,  D.C.).  See  also  Michael
Chamberlin et al.,  Sovereign Debt Exchanges, 1988  U.  ILL. L. REv.  415,  415 & nn.1-4.
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the early  1980s,  poor  countries  received  a  $40  billion  per year
surplus  from  rich  countries;  by  1988,  they  were  sending  back
many  billions  more  to  service  their debts.54  It is  fully  plausible
that debt is the most urgent problem confronting  developing na-
tions in the world today. Above all, the problem is that debts must
be paid  before  these  nations  can  shift  their efforts  to  economic
and social  development.
A particular  difficulty  is  that  the existence  of foreign  debt  in-
creases the pressure on developing countries to exploit their nat-
ural resources, and to do so quickly. The use of natural resources
may provide the simplest way to obtain the funds necessary  to pay
off debts.  Such resources  as  waters,  parks,  soils,  and forests  are
the principal economic assets in these nations. Indeed, at the urg-
ing of the finance ministries of creditor nations and international
agencies such  as the World  Bank and the International Monetary
Fund ("IMF"), many debtor nations have fashioned economic ad-
justment  programs  that  revolve  around  efforts  to  increase  ex-
ports.55  Since  primary commodities  (non-manufactured  goods)
comprise  a  substantial  share  of exports  from  most  severely  in-
debted countries,  strategies of this kind tax  the natural resources
of these countries  and threaten the long-term viability of their re-
source-based  economies. 56  The irony is that long-term  develop-
ment  requires  measures  that  preserve  an  adequate  stock  of
natural resources for local use and export in forestry, agriculture,
fishing, and tourism, among others;  these are precisely  the meas-
ures endangered  by current export  strategies.
In Latin America in particular, the need to obtain funds to meet
debt obligations  has put an immense amount of pressure on eco-
logical systems. The resulting policy has been to do little to com-
bat domestic  problems  while  encouraging  the  export of natural
resources  to developed countries  at  a rate that prevents the  sus-
tainable use of those resources. 57  The  environmental  resources
54.  LEAN  ET AL.,  supra note  17,  at 44.
55.  See Westlake  I, supra note 45, at  12.
56.  In  1987  to  1988,  primary, nonfuel commodities  comprised 39.3%  of exports from
severely indebted  middle-income countries and 52.5%  of exports  from  severely indebted
low-income countries.  WORLD DEVELOPMENT  REPORT  1990, supra note 24, at 20, Table  1.4.
Current price  trends, moreover,  threaten  to exacerbate this  dynamic.  If the 33%  decline
in commodity  prices  from  1980  to  1989 continues, developing  countries may  seek to ex-
port increasing quantities of commodities to obtain the same amount of revenue.  Id. at  13.
57.  See WORLD COMMISSION  ON  ENVIRONMENT  AND  DEVELOPMENT,  supra note  13, at 6, 73-Economics  and  the Environment
of developing countries have  thus been under severe strain.  Ethi-
opia's forest cover, for example, has diminished from 30%  to 1%
of its territory and India's from over 50% to less  than  14%.58  In
Africa,  twenty-nine  trees  are  cut  down  for  every  one  that  is
planted.59  The  result  of the  exploitation  of existing  resources,
made necessary  in part by debt burdens, is reduction in the stock
of environmental  capital,  which  increases  rates  of poverty,  hun-
ger, and death.
60
There  are  plausible  arguments  that,  for various  reasons,  the
debt owed by developing countries should be forgiven or in some
sense relieved or repudiated.  We have seen that the existence of
debt  imposes  environmental  burdens  on  developing  countries,
burdens that  produce risks  for developed  countries  as  well.  For
this reason it is possible that debt forgiveness  is in the interest of
all  nations. There are  a number  of other justifications  for relief.
In Latin  America,  for  example,  borrowing  has  been  undertaken
by  military  governments  without  a  solid  connection  to  the  citi-
zenry,  with the  purpose of providing  for massive  arms  spending
or permitting capital  flight.6'  Debt  might  be forgiven when it is
unclear if the leaders who incurred debts had legitimate authority
to act on behalf of their countries;  perhaps citizens in these coun-
tries should not be obligated to pay debts that were not a product
of any plausible  conception of consent  or mutual  benefit.
The  dramatic  increases  in  the  expense  and  difficulty  of debt
servicing may be attributable to circumstances  that were not and
could not have been anticipated by debtor nations.  For example,
real interest rates increased from zero or negative in the  1970s to
more than eight percent  under the United  States price  index  in
the  early  1980s. 62  This  increase  in  the  burden  of debt interest
service, which  had no historical antecedents, was accompanied by
an increase  in the value  of the dollar, in which  most debt is  de-
58.  See Jim MacNeill,  Strategies for Sustainable Economic Development, in  MANAGING  PLANET
EARTH  108,  112-13  (1990).
59.  Id.  at  113.
60.  See generally DAVID  PEARCE ET AL.,  SUSTAINABLE  DEVELOPMENT:  ECONOMICS  AND  ENVI-
RONMENT  IN  THE THIRD  WORLD  (1990).
61.  See John Williamson,  The Outlook for Debt Relief or Repudiation in Latin America,  2  Ox-
FORD  REV.  ECON.  POL.  1,  4  (1986).
62.  Real interest rates climbed as high as 9%  in mid-1981,  while they had been as low as
-3%  in  1975.  Even  the average  of the years  1980  to 1989,  at 5.85%,  was nearly  six  times
the average  of the years  1974 to  1979 - when  the developing countries  took  on a  large
portion of their debt - at  0.97%.  WORLD  DEVELOPMENT  REPORT  1990, supra note 24,  at
14-15 & Fig.  1.6.
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nominated.  The various increases were a function of shifts in the
policies  of industrialized  nations,  and  they  were  aggravated  by
IMF  policies  raising  the costs  faced  by debtors.63  On  this  view,
industrialized  nations are  now under an obligation  to undertake
debt relief.
There are other arguments  for relief as well.  As we have seen,
foreign debt imposes a crippling burden on developing countries.
This burden  has been an  obstacle to both  internal development
and environmental  protection.  The  result  is  considerable  inter-
national  distrust and  ill  will  as well  as  domestic  instability.  The
existence of large  debts has thus imposed severe pressure on the
global  economic  system.  It has  also  required  poor  countries  to
spend  so much money on the  servicing of loans that they  are un-
able  to  pay  for imported  goods.6  As  many  as  six  million jobs
may  have been  lost in  the developed  world  because  of the  debt
crisis.65  These  arguments  suggest  that  debt  cancellation  might
increase  international harmony, help the export capacities  of de-
veloping  nations,  eliminate  a  crucial  reason  for  environmental
degradation, and operate as a mutually beneficial  form of foreign
aid.
6 6
We do not seek to evaluate these claims here.  Among the obvi-
ous  difficulties  in  any  large-scale  debt  relief  program  are:  the
problem  of determining  whether,  ex  ante or ex post,  any  govern-
ment  has  a  legitimate  claim  to act  on behalf of its  citizenry;  the
potential  unfairness  to  creditors  of permitting  resources  loaned
to developing nations  to disappear;  and the possibility that debt
relief or repudiation will in the end harm developing countries by
discouraging creditors  from offering  loans to them in the first in-
63.  Id. at  15;  LEAN  ET  AL.,  supra note  17,  at  44.
64.  See George  C. Abbott,  The Case  for Cancellation, 1975 INTERECONOMICS  217, 220.  For
the view  that coordinated debt forgiveness can sometimes benefit all sides, see Kenneth A.
Froot, Buybacks, Exit  Bonds, and the Optimality of Debt and Liquidity Relief, 30 INT'L ECON.  REV.
49  (1989).
65.  See  LEAN  ET  AL.,  supra note  17,  at 44.
66.  For a discussion  emphasizing  the benefits  to creditor  nations of taking on some of
the debtors'  burdens, see  Bogdanowicz-Bindert  & Feinberg, supra note 53,  at  2-3.  It  has
been suggested that this view  accounts  at least in part  for the "official  sanctioning" of the
principle and necessity of debt relief, as evidenced by the agreement reached  by the group
of seven  industrial  powers  at the  1988  Toronto  Economic  Summit.  There  the creditor
governments  undertook to cancel,  reduce,  or  restructure  one-third of the debt  owed  to
them by the poorest countries. See generally  WORLD  DEVELOPMENT  REPORT 1990, supra note
24, at  126;  Westlake  II, supra note 46, at  13.  The governments of Canada,  Germany, the
United  Kingdom,  and the  United  States have  forgiven  $5  billion  in public loans  to sub-
Saharan  African countries.  See Postel  & Flavin, supra note 24,  at  170,  176.Economics  and  the Environment
stance.  Because there is no conventional legal mechanism for en-
suring  that  debt  is  paid  back,  a  firm  international  practice  of
payment is perhaps the only guarantee that can be given to other-
wise reluctant  creditors.  Whether loan  forgiveness  is justified  in
the  particular  context  of developing  nations  in  the  1990s  is  a
question  that cannot be  resolved  here.  We will assume that any
large-scale  program of forgiveness  is  unlikely,  while  noting that
the case for loan forgiveness might have implications for debt-for-
nature and technology-for-nature  trades.
The  picture  that  emerges,  then,  is  one  in  which  developing
countries  are under severe economic  pressure, in significant part
because of foreign debt, and in which environmental  degradation
is a predictable  if myopic strategy for the accumulation  of neces-
sary  funds.  Part  III explores  strategies  that deal  simultaneously
with the existence  of foreign  debt and  environmental  harms.
III.  TRADING  DEBT  FOR  NATURE
A.  The Agreement
1.  History
The  idea  that  debt  might be  exchanged  for nature  was  origi-
nally  proposed  in  1984  by  Dr. Thomas  E.  Lovejoy,  then  Vice-
President  for  Science  at  the  World  Wildlife  Fund  ("WWF").
Lovejoy noted that programs calling for the management  of natu-
ral  resources  were  often  eliminated  by  countries  that  needed  to
reduce spending.  Such countries thereafter relied on foreign do-
nors  to obtain the funds  necessary to support national parks.  Ac-
cording  to  Lovejoy,  it would  be a simple  and direct  solution  for
developed  countries  to take  advantage  of the debt  crisis  to deal
with environmental  problems  that threatened developing and in-
dustrialized nations alike.  The solution was to create transactions
by  which  public  or private  actors  in  developed  countries  would
agree  to retire some of the debt of a developing  nation in return
for an agreement  to protect  natural resources. 67
The idea  was  implemented  for the  first time  in  1987.  Lender
banks,  especially  frustrated  that  debts  had  appeared  to  become
67.  See Thomas  E.  Lovejoy  III,  Aid Debtor  Nations' Ecology,  N.Y. TIMES,  Oct.  4,  1984, at
A31;  Kathryn  S.  Fuller  & Douglas  F.  Williamson,  Debt-for-Nature Swaps:  A  New  Means  of
Funding Conservation in Developing Nations,  II  Int'l  Envtl. Rep.  (BNA)  301  (May  1i,  1988).
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uncollectible,  sought new means  for alleviating  this liability.68  A
number of conservation  organizations  offered to acquire foreign
debt from the banks and then retire the debt in return for conser-
vation.  The first swap  occurred in July  1987,  as Conservation  In-
ternational  ("CI"), a private organization, purchased  $650,000  of
Bolivia's  commercial  debt  through Citicorp Investment  Bank for
$100,000.  In  exchange  the  President  of Bolivia  agreed  to  set
aside over four million acres of tropical forest for national protec-
tion and to create  a $250,000  fund for managing  the area.69
Many  debt-for-nature  trades  have  followed.  In  December
1987,  Ecuador and  the  United  States  branch  of WWF  ("WWF-
US") completed an exchange involving the purchase of $1 million
of Ecuadoran debt at thirty-five cents on the dollar;  this exchange
was  the first of a  $10  million debt-for-nature  program  approved
by the government  of Ecuador.  The second exchange  under the
Ecuadoran  program,  involving  the  remaining  $9  million,  took
place  in April  1989. The Nature  Conservancy  ("TNC") and  the
Missouri Botanical Gardens joined WWF-US as purchasers  of the
debt  at twelve  cents on the dollar.70
Costa Rica participated in its first of five exchanges in February
1988.  A recent swap, in March  1990, brought the total face value
of Costa Rican  debt exchanged to $79,253,631.  The purchasers
of the  debt  involved  in  the  various  Costa  Rican  exchanges  in-
cluded WWF-US,  TNC, Holland, Sweden,  and the National Parks
Foundation  of Costa Rica,  with WWF  assistance. 71
WWF-US  has completed two swaps in the Philippines,  the most
recent  of which  occurred  in August  1990,  exchanging  an aggre-
gate  of $1,290,000,  at  rates of 51  and 48.75  cents on  the  dollar
68.  For a  discussion  of the range  of items  on banks'  "menus"  of available  financing
options,  see  generally  Chamberlin et al.,  supra note 53.
69.  See Blueprint  for Conservation and Development: Swapping Debt for Nature, TROPIcus,  Fall
1987  (available  from  Conservation  International,  Washington,  D.C.).  See  also  WORLD
WILDLIFE  FUND, THE  BOLIVIAN  CASE  (undated and unpublished document, available  from
WWF,  Washington,  D.C.).
70.  See WORLD  WILDLIFE  FUND,  THE  ECUADORAN  CASE  (undated and unpublished docu-
ment, available from WWF, Washington, D.C.);  WORLD WILDLIFE  FUND,  OFFICIALLY SANC-
TIONED  AND  FUNDED  DEBT-FOR-NATURE  SWAPS  TO  DATE:  DECEMBER  1990  (unpublished
table, available  from  WWF, Washington,  D.C.)  [hereinafter  WWF  SWAPS  TO  DATE].
71.  See WORLD  WILDLIFE  FUND,  THE COSTA  RICAN  CASE (undated and unpublished doc-
ument,  available  from WWF, Washington, D.C.); WWF  SWAPS  TO  DATE,  supra note 70.Economics  and  the  Environment
respectively.72  WWF-US'  two exchanges  in  Madagascar  involved
a  total of $3,030,475;  in  Zambia,  WWF-International  purchased
debt  with  a  face  value  of $2,270,000;  and  in  Poland,  WWF-US
purchased $50,000 of debt.73  TNC and the Puerto Rican Conser-
vation  Trust, in March  1990,  bought debt of the Dominican  Re-
public having  a face  value of $582,000.
74
2.  Mechanics
The  mechanics  of debt-for-nature  swaps  follow  a  basic  pat-
tern.75  An interested  group, usually an international  nongovern-
mental  organization  ("NGO"),  purchases,  on  the  secondary
market, developing country debt held by an international lender.
The price  is  discounted  from the face  value of the debt.76  The
purchasing group then trades  its right to  repayment of the debt
for a commitment on the part of the developing nation to protect,
in some  fashion, the environmentally  vulnerable  lands within  its
territory.  This trade may involve exchanging the debt instrument
directly for legislative  protection  by  the  debtor country  govern-
ment.  Alternatively,  it  may  involve  transferring  the  debt  to  a
debtor country conservation  organization,  which will then turn it
over  to  its  government  in  exchange  for local  currency  or  local
currency  bonds  to  be  used  to  finance  a  conservation  program
managed  by the local group.
The  parties  to  debt-for-nature  agreements  have  fashioned  a
number of variations on this basic model.  These variations  often
increase  the  complexity  of the  deal,  but  they  also  increase  the
likelihood  of serving the  interests  of everyone  involved.  In the
Bolivia swap, CI traded the debt that it had purchased on the sec-
ondary market with the government of Bolivia in direct exchange
72.  WWF SWAPS  TO DATE,  supra note 70; WORLD WILDLIFE FUND,  PHILIPPINES DEBT-FOR-
NATURE  SWAP  TERM  SHEET  (undated  and  unpublished document,  available from  WWF,
Washington,  D.C.).
73.  WWF  SWAPS  TO  DATE,  supra note 70.
74.  Id.
75.  For an elaboration on  the mechanics of debt-for-nature  swaps  and a description  of
the process of negotiating such transactions, see Konrad von Moltke, Debt for Nature:  An
Overview  1-2  (undated and unpublished paper, available from WWF,  Washington,  D.C.).
76.  To  date,  debt-for-nature  trades  have  involved  the  purchase  of commercial  bank
debt, for which a secondary market exists; discussions are underway,  however, to enlist the
resources  of some  types  of bilateral government debt for these  swaps.  See  DEBT-FOR-NA-
TURE:  SOME  COMMON  QUESTIONS  2-3  (Sept.  1990)  (unpublished  paper,  available  from
WWF,  Washington,  D.C.).
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for legislative  measures. 77  In  successive  swaps,  the  nature  por-
tion of the transactions has most often been structured to include
support  for local  conservation  groups  - a  crucial  step.  In  the
first  exchange  of  the  Ecuadoran  program,  WWF-US  acquired
debt with a face value of $1 million at thirty-five cents on the dol-
lar  and  assigned  this  debt  to  Fundaci6n  Natura.  Fundaci6n
Natura  exchanged  this debt for government  bonds issued in su-
cres  at  100%  of the debt's face value.  Both the interest and the
principal of the nine-year bonds are to be used to finance Funda-
ci6n Natura  conservation activities. 78
The mechanics of the Philippines swap were similar to those in
the Ecuadoran swap, except that the exchange was for cash rather
than  local  currency  bonds.  The  Philippines'  Central  Bank
credited the full value of the debt to a local currency account for
the benefit  of the Haribon  Foundation,  a conservation  group  in
the Philippines,  and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources .79
3.  Environmental  Commitments
The  environmental  commitments  undertaken  in  the  various
swaps accommodate  a  broad array of ecological  and  policy goals
of the various  developing countries.  These  commitments  range
from  the  preservation  of specific  areas,  to  the creation  of pro-
grams  for education  and  training,  to  the establishment  of funds
for environmental  uses  whose details  are left to later  determina-
tion.  In the  Bolivian arrangement,  for example,  the government
elevated  to  the  highest  legal  protective  status  the  existing
334,200-acre  Beni  Biosphere  Reserve.  It  also  created,  with  the
same level of legal protection, an adjoining 877,205-acre  reserve,
as  well  as  an  additional  2,870,561-acre  buffer  zone  - the
Chimane Forest Reserve - to be developed in a sustainable man-
77.  See THE  BOLIVIAN  CASE,  supra note 69.
78.  See WORLD WILDLIFE  FUND,  ECUADOR  DEBT-FOR-NATURE  SWAP TERM SHEET (undated
and  unpublished  document,  available  from  WWF,  Washington,  D.C.);  THE  ECUADORAN
CASE,  supra note 70.  The first exchange  of the Costa Rican  program  was  similarly  struc-
tured, although the bonds issued in colones represented only 75% of the face value of the
indebtedness  for which they were exchanged.  WORLD  WILDLIFE  FUND,  COSTA RICA  DEBT-
FOR-NATURE  SWAP  TERM  SHEET  (undated  and  unpublished  document,  available  from
WWF,  Washington,  D.C.);  THE  COSTA  RICAN  CASE,  supra note  71.  For  criticism  of this
aspect of the Costa Rican arrangement, see Chamberlin et al.,  supra note 53,  at 445 n. 115.
79.  See  PHILIPPINES  DEBT-FOR-NATURE  SWAP TERM  SHEET, supra note 72;  WORLD  WILD-
LIFE  FUND,  THE  PHILIPPINES  CASE  (undated and  unpublished  document,  available  from
WWF, Washington,  D.C.).Economics  and  the Environment
ner.  Finally,  Bolivia  designated  the local currency  equivalent  of
$250,000  for  the  establishment  of an  operational  fund  for  the
management  of the Biosphere  Reserve.80
Under  the  Ecuadoran  agreement,  the  interest  paid  on  the
bonds  during  the first  year  is  to be used  for the protection  and
management  of  several  specified  parks  and  reserves. 81  The
agreement provides that the interest paid on the bonds in succes-
sive  years  is  to be used for projects  later selected  by  Fundaci6n
Natura,  in  conjunction  with  WWF-US.  Upon  maturity  of  the
bonds, the principal is  designated for the establishment of an en-
dowment  fund  to  support  the  general  activities  of Fundaci6n
Natura.
82
The Philippines swap, in addition to funding the protection and
management  of two  specified  reserves,  emphasizes  the need  for
education and training. The agreement envisages  a range of pro-
grams,  from field training to university fellowships.  The terms of
the  agreement  prohibit  the  use  of any  of the  proceeds  for  the
compensation  of non-Philippine  consultants.83
The Madagascar commitments include funding the training and
equipment of 400 park rangers  for certain protected  areas. 84  Fi-
nally,  the Zambia agreement,  among other things, provides  spe-
cifically  for  the  alleviation  of  habitat  degradation  and  the
protection  of that country's  threatened  rhinoceros  and  elephant
populations .85
80.  See Chamberlin  et al.,  supra  note 53, at 441-42; THE  BOLIVIAN  CASE, supra note 69;
Debt  Trade  Follow  Up  in the Beni  Reserve,  TROPICUS,  Winter  1988  (available from Conserva-
tion International,  Washington,  D.C.).
81.  "Protection  and management"  includes  the elaboration of management  plans,  the
building of a management  infrastructure,  the institution of preservation  and environmen-
tal education programs,  and the sustainable use of natural  resources.  The designated  ar-
eas are the Cayambe-Coca Ecological Reserve, the Cotacachi-Cayapas  Ecological  Reserve,
the Sangay  National Park, the Podocarpus National  Park, the Cuyabeno Wildlife Reserve,
the Yasuni National Park, the Galapagos National Park, and the Pasochoa Nature Reserve.
Attachment  to  Debt-for-Nature  Agreement  of December  14,  1987,  between  WWF-U.S.
and Fundaci6n  Natura (unpublished  document, available from WWF,  Washington,  D.C.).
82.  See  ECUADOR  DEBT-FOR-NATURE  SWAP  TERM  SHEET,  supra  note 78;  THE  ECUADORAN
CASE,  supra note  70.
83.  See  THE  PHILIPPINES  CASE,  supra  note 79.
84.  See  Kathryn  S.  Fuller,  Debt-for-Nature  Swaps,  23  ENVTL.  Sci.  &  TECH.  1450,  1451
(1989).
85.  See  WORLD  WILDLIFE  FUND,  ZAMBIA  DEBT-FOR-NATURE  SWAP  TEEM  SHEET  (undated
and unpublished  document,  available  from WWF,  Washington,  D.C.).
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B.  Objections
There  have  been  a  number  of objections  to  debt-for-nature
trades. The objections  generally fall  into four categories:  (a) no-
tions  of political  and  economic  sovereignty,  (b)  allegations  of
colonialism,  (c)  administrative  and enforcement  difficulties,  and
(d)  limited results.  We  address  each  of these objections  in turn.
1.  Sovereignty
Some  observers  argue  that  debt-for-nature  exchanges  pose  a
threat to  national sovereignty.  This  objection  has taken  various
forms.  Former President  Sarney  of Brazil has claimed  that these
exchanges  are part  of a campaign  to  halt  development  in  poor
nations.8 6  Labor leaders  in Bolivia  have  criticized  what  they  see
as,  in effect,  a sale  of national  assets to large  international  inter-
ests.8 7  They contend that "if land today can be sold for environ-
mental protection,  tomorrow  it can be sold under another  cover
but  with  the  same  end:  accepting  the dictates  of the  centers  of
political  and  economic power." 8  On  this view,  the  debt-for-na-
ture swap  represents an effort by the economic powers of the de-
veloped  north  to  exert  political  authority  over  the  developing
south.
At  least  in  general,  we  believe  that  this  objection  has  little
merit.  If  developing  countries  have  voluntarily  entered  into
agreements  to  trade  debt  for  nature,  the  fact  that  such  agree-
ments  entail  an intrusion  on what  would  otherwise  be rights  of
sovereignty is no objection.  By hypothesis, both parties  to a vol-
untary agreement  are  made  better off.  Indeed,  the  existence  of
foreign debt may well be a far greater threat to sovereignty than is
an agreement  to protect natural assets.  Debt itself entails owner-
ship of national  assets  by others.  If  this  is  so, sovereignty  is  en-
hanced rather  than diminished  by debt-for-nature  trades.  In any
case, that issue appears  at first glance  to be one for the develop-
ing  nation  to  decide;  if the  decision  is  voluntary,  the  objection
from sovereignty  seems  weak.
More refined versions of the objection, however, are somewhat
more plausible.  Under the immediate pressure of the debt crisis,
86.  Hobart Rowen,  Heading Off an Amazon  Disaster,  WASH.  POST,  Apr. 2,  1989,  at HI.
87.  Erick  Foronda, Bolivia's 'Debt-for-Nature'  Swap  Comes  Under Fire,  LATINAMERICA  PRESS,
Oct.  20,  1989,  at 7.
88. Id. (quoting labor leader Andrbs  Soliz  Rada).Economics  and  the Environment
developing  nations  may be  tempted  to enter into  contracts  that
are not in their best long-term interest because  they create a per-
manent loss of control over natural resources.  Here the problem
is  that the  relevant  deal reflects  a form of myopia  - a  rationale
often brought  forth  to bar seemingly voluntary  agreements.8 9
Alternatively, it may be suggested that certain attributes of sov-
ereignty should not be commodified,  that is, that states ought not
to be authorized  to trade aspects of self-government  in return for
money.  It might well  be troubling, for example, if a country fac-
ing an enormous  debt decided  to trade,  in exchange  for dollars,
the  power  to make  a set  of future  decisions about its  social and
economic development,  its religious and ethical  commitments,  its
basic  culture, or its forms  of governance.  This example presents
two problems. The first involves one set of people binding future
citizens  who  are  not actual  parties  to  the  deal.  The  second  in-
volves  the decision  to allow  a portion of self-governance  - here
the power to manage  natural resources  - to be traded  on mar-
kets at all.
In the context of the ordinary debt-for-nature  trade, we believe
that these problems do not amount to powerful objections.  With
respect  to  the  questions  of myopia  and implications  for  future
generations, the central point is that the decision to protect natu-
ral resources is,  to  a significant degree, in the long-term interests
of the developing  nation,  and  is  subjectively  perceived  as  such.
As we have  seen, the exploitation of resources is  often a product
of the external pressure of the debt crisis rather than  some inter-
nal free choice.  The trade helps  to relieve that pressure.  More-
over,  and  crucially,  future  generations  are  made  better  rather
than worse off through arrangements that relieve their own finan-
cial  pressures,  which  would  otherwise  produce  environmental
degradation posing a  severe threat  to future  citizens.
We  also  believe  that  the  debt-for-nature  trade  poses  no  real
threat  of commodifying  a  nation's  power  of self-governance.90
Any intrusion of that sort is minor in  scale and scope.  The pres-
ence  of debt itself creates  precisely  the same  threat, and  to the
extent that the trade reduces foreign debt, it actually frees  up the
nation's  capacity  for  self-governance.  Moreover,  the  trade  en-
89.  See, e.g.,  Cass R.  Sunstein, Legal Interference With Private  Preferences, 53 U. Cm. L.  REV.
1129,  1164-66  (1986)  (discussing  myopia).
90.  Cf. Margaret Jane  Radin,  Market Inalienability, 100  Harv.  L.  Rev.  1849  (1987)  (dis-
cussing the risks  of commodifying  in general).
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ables the  nation to overcome  a form  of myopia,  again produced
by  external  pressures,  rather  than submitting  to it.  Frequently,
economic development  that is insufficiently respectful of environ-
mental  needs  is  a  straightforward  sacrifice  of the future, and  of
future  generations,  for the  immediate present.  Insofar  as debt-
for-nature trades counteract this tendency, they are in the interest
of everyone  involved.
As  we discuss  below,  the  relevant concerns  about  sovereignty
can  be  met  through  creative  structuring  of the  trade. 9'  Such
structuring attempts to ensure  local participation and autonomy,
thus strengthening local  institutions and  local options.
2..  Colonialism
It  is  sometimes  suggested  that  the  debt-for-nature  trade  in-
volves  a  form  of colonialism,  that  is,  the imposition  by  wealthy
countries  of values  held  by  them,  an  imposition  made  possible
only by disparities in wealth.  This argument  seems largely to re-
capitulate arguments from sovereignty, and to do so in especially
dramatic  form.
We do not believe that this objection is persuasive.  So long as
the  debts  have  been  lawfully  incurred,  the  foreign  country  has
voluntarily entered into the deal,  the agreement  is  structured to
promote  the  ability  of the  developing nation  to  choose  its  own
means  of providing protection,  and  the  goal  is  to prevent  envi-
ronmental  degradation,  the  objection  of  colonialism  seems
misplaced.
To say this is not to deny that the objection points to significant
risks.  In  light  of those  risks,  it is  important  to  ensure  that  the
arrangement is organized so as to promote flexibility and to maxi-
mize  the  capacity  of the  developing  country  to  protect  its  own
resources in  its own way.  Agreements by which developed coun-
tries impose a highly particular environmental  philosophy,  select
means of carrying out environmental  ends, or conscript  manage-
rial authority  that might  otherwise be  respectful  of native norms
and  traditions,  might  well  provide  a  basis  for  legitimate  com-
plaint. We return  to these  issues below. 92
91.  See infra part III(C).
92.  See infra part III(C).Economics  and  the Environment
3.  Administrative  and Enforcement  Difficulties
Sometimes  it  is  said that the  debt-for-nature  trade poses insu-
perable problems  of administration  and enforcement.  Suppose,
for example, that a question is raised about whether the develop-
ing country has complied with some provisions of the deal.  How
are  such questions to be resolved?  No international tribunal is in
a position  to ensure compliance with the agreement or to provide
remedies in  the event of a default.
Without an enforcement  mechanism,  the parties must depend
on the monitoring capacity of one side or on the good faith of the
other.  Perhaps  these  will be sufficient,  independently  or in con-
junction,  in  most  cases.  Without  more  particular  information,
however, it is difficult to know whether optimism  is justified.  For
this reason,  concerns about administrability  are warranted.93
4.  Limited Results
It is also suggested that debt-for-nature trades will, at best, pro-
duce  limited  results.  Although  recent  exchanges  and programs
have  involved increasingly ambitious  amounts of debt, numerous
financial  and  regulatory  constraints  remain.  First,  commercial
banks  have only limited incentives  to sell or donate  the debt  for
use in  such  exchanges.  Such  banks  would,  of course,  prefer  to
receive  full repayment of the debts.  In light of ongoing debt ne-
gotiations, they will usually be reluctant to compromise their bar-
gaining position by offering a discounted rate in a debt-for-nature
exchange.
Despite these limitations,  banks will realize some benefits from
the donation or sale of the debt at a greatly reduced price.  In the
case of a  sale, banks can remove from their books  a nonperform-
ing loan and receive a bad debt tax deduction for the remainder;
in the case of a donation, they  will gain  goodwill from  favorable
93.  According to  the  March  1990  report of the compliance  review  of the  1988  Costa
Rican swap, the parties charged with managing the trust and its  yield have performed  well
and Parque Nacional Guanacaste ("PNG") has been undertaking in  good faith to purchase
a parcel  of land identified for protection under the swap arrangement.  See  WORLD  WILD-
LIFE  FUND,  COMPLIANCE  REVIEW  OF  1988  COSTA  RICAN  DEBT-FOR-NATURE  AGREEMENT  5
(March  1990)  (unpublished report,  available  from WWF,  Washington,  D.C.)  [hereinafter
COSTA  RICAN  COMPLIANCE  REPORT].  The problem  remains,  however,  that it is  simply too
early to assess the level of compliance, and conclusions drawn in audits of the sort under-
taken  by WWF in Costa  Rica are preliminary  at  best.
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publicity and receive  generous tax treatment.94  In general,  how-
ever, these benefits simply do not warrant - especially in the eyes
of the shareholders - large-scale use by the banks of this strategy
for reducing their outstanding debt.95  The limited incentives  for
participation  by banks significantly reduce the effectiveness of the
debt-for-nature  scheme in  eliminating third world debt.
Other potential  sources  of financing  can,  at  present,  provide
only relatively small amounts.  International NGOs  cannot devote
financial  resources  on  the  scale  required,  and international  aid
agencies have been, for the most part, unable or unwilling to offer
significant  funding.96  Moreover, regulations  imposed  by  debtor
nations, and restrictions  imposed by  previous  debt restructuring
agreements,  may  limit the amount  of debt  eligible for  debt-for-
nature  exchanges.
97
94.  For  a  detailed  analysis  of the  relevant  United  States. tax  incentives  after recent
changes,  see  Terrill A.  Hyde,  U.S.  Taxes:  The  Issues  (undated and  unpublished  paper,
available from  WWF, Washington,  D.C.).
95.  Nonetheless,  insofar as  banks  have  decided  to  trade  their debt  on  the  secondary
market,  conservation  groups are welcomed  as would  be any other purchaser.  Many  addi-
tional  factors  explain  individual  banks'  interests  in debt-for-nature  exchanges,  including
their portfolio  composition and their desire  to maintain  long-term financial  relations with
particular countries.  For discussion of commercial banks'  perspective  on debt exchanges,
on which  we  have  drawn  here, see  von Moltke,  supra note 75,  at  3-4; Chamberlin  et al.,
supra note 53.
96.  The  participation  of  the  United  States'  Agency  for  International  Development
("AID") in the Madagascar  swap provides  a welcome exception  to the general  reluctance
of governmental  aid agencies.  AID granted $1 million to WWF to facilitate the  1989 Mad-
agascar exchange.  See A Debt to Nature, THE  ECONOMIST,  Aug.  19,  1989,  at 31.
Although  the multilateral development  banks  ("MDBs") have  yet to commit funds to a
debt-for-nature swap, there have been several  indications of support, from, among others,
the United  States Department of Treasury  and the MDBs  themselves, for  involving MDBs
in the financing of these arrangements.  Congress enacted, in December  1989, The Inter-
national Development  and Finance  Act of 1989,  encouraging,  among other things,  MDB
involvement in debt-for-nature  swaps.  See International  Debt Exchanges and the Environ-
ment, Title V,  Subtitle B of the International  Development and Finance Act of 1989,  Pub.
L. No.  101-240,  §§  511-12,  103 Stat. 2492, 2507-10 (codified at 22 U.S.C.  §§  262p-4i-4k,
2
62p-5  (Supp.  I  1989)).  The  International  Bank  for  Reconstruction  and  Development
supports  the debt-for-nature  swap  strategy, but  claims  that its  charter  prevents  it  from
financing  or  negotiating  debt-for-nature  swaps  involving  outstanding  public  debt,
although  it  might be able to perform the function of a clearinghouse  for information.  See
Chamberlin  et al.,  supra note  53,  at  440 n.99;  WORLD  BANK,  THE  WORLD  BANK  AND  THE
ENVIRONMENT:  FIRST ANNUAL  REPORT  78-79 (1990).
For  criticism  of World Bank's  rhetoric without  action,  see Joannides, supra note  11,  at
175  & n.75.
97.  Not all  public  sector debt  of a developing  country  may  be  eligible  for  exchange.
Some  restrictions  are  carried  on  the debt  instruments  themselves;  others  are  informal,
imposed for  policy reasons by  the developing countries.  See Chamberlin  et al., supra note
53,  at  435 & nn.81-82.  See also von Moltke, supra note 75, at  1-2.Economics  and the Environment
Finally, large-scale  debt exchanges  have  a serious potential  in-
flationary  impact  on  the  economy  of the  developing  country. 98
This  consideration  necessarily  imposes limitations  on the magni-
tude of debt-for-nature  programs.  Participants  in recent  swaps,
sensitive  to  this  potential  problem,  have  included  mechanisms
that mitigate inflationary  effects,  such  as converting debt  into lo-
cal  bonds  rather  than  cash.99  Yet  they  concede  that addressing
this  criticism will at some point require the imposition of ceilings
on the amount of debt converted.100  It appears  that the extent of
environmental  protection  to be generated  by  such trades  will be
far less than  is necessary  to protect the long-term  environmental
interests of either the developing nation  or the world.
This point is crucial.  Even if debt-for-nature exchanges were to
continue to grow in number and scope, they would have only lim-
ited  impact.  The  debt  of developing  countries  is  so  enormous
that  trades  of this  sort  will  make  only  small  inroads. 10  Even
more  important,  developing  countries  cannot  continue  to meet
the  burdensome  requirements  of debt  servicing  and repayment
by engaging in unsustainable productive practices.  We have  seen
that the self-destructive  nature of these practices threatens  severe
environmental harm. 1 02
A more basic  problem is  that the solution offered  by debt-for-
nature swaps is  superficial.  It does not provide a mechanism  for
changing  the  incentives  for  engaging  in  destructive  behavior.
Debt-for-nature  trades  do  little to  change  the underlying  pres-
sures of debt and environmental  destruction, and do not offer an
alternative  way  for developing  countries  to  manage  these  pres-
sures.  In failing to present a long-term solution,  debt-for-nature
trades can provide  only a partial  corrective.
98.  See  Chamberlin et  al., supra note 53,  at 446.
99.  See Fuller, supra note 84,  at  1451.
100.  See Fuller & Williamson, supra note 67,  at 302, 303;  David Reed,  Debt for  Nature
Controversies  (Dec.  1989)  (unpublished paper,  available from WWF, Washington,  D.C.).
101.  It should be noted, however, that some proponents of debt-for-nature  swaps main-
tain  that these  arrangements  were never intended  to have  an  appreciable  impact on  the
debt crisis.  See Reed, supra note  100.  Instead, they argue, the  purchase and exchange  of
discounted debt merely serves as a funding mechanism, permitting developed countries or
international  environmental  groups  to leverage  their conservation  dollars.  See Fuller  &
Williamson, supra note 67,  at 302.
102.  See supra part  II(A).
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This point is not an objection to such trades.  It is an invitation
to develop alternative  strategies for promoting sustainable devel-
opment. We  turn to such  mechanisms  in  Part IV.
C.  Variations in Answer to Criticisms
It is possible to structure  debt-for-nature  trades  so  as  to mini-
mize the grounds for objection.  In each case, of course, the trans-
action must  be designed  to  address  the unique  concerns  of the
individual  debtor  country.  We  believe,  however,  that  there  are
many general lessons to be taken from the experiences of existing
swaps.
Perhaps  the  most important  is  the need  to  take  into  account
legitimate sovereignty concerns.  Ideally, the debtor nation would
initiate  a  debt-for-nature  program  and  approach  international
NGOs  to  participate  in  exchanges  under  the  program. 0 3
Whether  or not  there  is  such  an  impetus,  however,  it  is  critical
that  the  debtor  country  government  and  local  conservation
groups be involved from the outset - contributing to the identifi-
cation of priorities;  to the conception  of projects;  and,  through-
out the projects, to  the management of activities.' 0 4
One strategy, favored by many participants  in existing debt-for-
nature programs,  involves  directing  funds to established  conser-
vation  programs  in  the debtor country.  This tactic responds  di-
rectly  to criticisms  that debt-for-nature  trades  provide  a  tool for
the imposition of northern values or of a particular environmental
ethic.  It also  undermines  claims  that local  conservation  groups
are being  co-opted  to  carry  out  the  goals  set  by  large  interna-
tional organizations.  Moreover,  because the debtor country gov-
ernment and, perhaps,  local conservation  groups  have  fashioned
the conservation  program  without external influence  from inter-
103.  The  fact  that the  concept  underlying  the  Ecuador  program  originated  with  the
then president of Fundaci6n Natura, Ecuador's leading private conservation organization,
is cited as contributing to the recognition of the Ecuador arrangement  as one of the most
successful  debt-for-nature  swaps.  See  Fuller, supra note  84,  at  1451.
104.  Id.  See  also Reed,  supra note  100.  For a  summary of the  criticisms  of the  initial
attempts at debt-for-nature  transactions, see Eve Burton, Debt for Development: A  New Oppor-
tunity for Nonprofits, Commercial Banks, and Developing States,  31  HARV.  INT'L  L.J.  233, 241-43
(1990).  We believe that, in concluding that all debt-for-nature swaps are inherently flawed
on this  count, Burton overstates  the case for sovereignty.  But  we agree  there are impor-
tant lessons  to be  learned  about  the need  to address  sovereignty  concerns.  Cf. MARTHA
ALTER  CHEN,  A  QuIET  REVOLUTION:  WOMEN  IN  TRANSITION  IN  RURAL  BANGLADESH  5-17
(1989)  (discussing overcoming of women's  illiteracy in Bangladesh through strategies that
incorporate views and  perspectives of Bangladeshi women).Economics  and  the Environment
national  NGOs  and others,  there  is  an increased  likelihood  that
the  funds  will  be used  to further  the  true  goals and interests  of
the  developing  country,  and  will  be  perceived  as  doing  so.  Fi-
nally, this strategy helps strengthen environmental  education and
environmental  constituencies  in the developing country, in a way
that should accomplish  long-term  good. 1 0 5
Concerns  about  administrability  and  implementation  can  also
be alleviated  in some measure  by careful  structuring of the  debt-
for-nature arrangement.  Again,  involvement by the debtor coun-
try conservation  group is  essential.  Local  groups  are in  the best
position  to  ensure that  programs  are  implemented.  They  have
established liaisons with the community and local public officials,
and these liaisons are often vital to carrying out the intended pro-
grams.' 0 6  Debtor  country  conservation  groups  also  have  the
greatest  interest  in  long-term  local  environmental  viability  and
thus in  the  success of the projects  undertaken  as  a result of the
swap.  Finally, they are in the best position to see that local knowl-
edge and experience  are brought  to bear on the implementation
of the  program,  thereby enhancing  its cultural  compatibility  and
its efficacy.
Another  means  of addressing  concerns  about  compliance  in-
volves  selection  of the right  mechanism  for disbursing  funds  in
the  developing  country.  Any  such  mechanism  should  enhance
the financial  stability - and thus the likelihood of continued suc-
cess  - of  environmental  protection  efforts.  One  desirable
method,  employed  in  the  Ecuador  arrangement,  is  the  use  of
bonds.  These provide an initial steady  flow of funds and create,
upon maturity, an endowment fund upon which  the local conser-
vation group can  rely for its  future activities. 1 0 7
In addition, agreements  should contain data collection and dis-
closure  agreements.  Annual  reports  might well  outline progress
105.  On the importance of internal initiative,  see JEAN  DR9ZE & AMARTYA  SEN,  HUNGER
AND  PUBLIC  ACTION  159  (1990).
106.  The  constant  involvement and  local  residency of the Parque Nacional Guanacaste
("PNG") in Costa Rica has been indispensable to ongoing negotiations  for the purchase of
the Santa Elena property, as contemplated by the swap agreement.  See COSTA  RICAN  COM-
PLIANCE  REPORT, supra note 93,  at  5.
107.  See Fuller  & Williamson, supra note  67, at 302  ("Because  the  [Ecuadoran]  bonds
have a nine-year term, the planning and implementation  of long-range programs  can pro-
ceed without fear that project funding may  be cut off next year.").  For the view that large
lump sum disbursements  can be problematic,  see von  Moltke, supra note 75,  at  5.
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on the relevant commitments.1 0 8  Finally, it is important to permit
funds  to  be used for purposes  of education  and increasing envi-
ronmental awareness  among the population  of the debtor nation.
One of the primary  goals for environmental  policy is  to increase
the  amount  and availability  of information  about  environmental
issues,  thereby promoting economic goals and, at the same  time,
serving democratic aspirations.  Such initiatives  also increase  the
likelihood that the environmental commitments  made in debt-for-
nature deals will survive future periods of economic difficulty.  By
promoting  local  understanding  of environmental  issues,  educa-
tion makes it more  likely that there will be sufficient political  will
to ensure  that the terms  of the  agreement  are upheld, and  that
conservation  and  other environmental  goals  will be promoted  in
the future.
The  overall  success  of debt-for-nature  transactions  can be in-
creased by attention to an array of related issues.  First, the poten-
tial inflationary impact of debt exchanges  should be mitigated by
the use of disbursement  mechanisms  that allow the debtor coun-
try  to  spread  any  repayments  to the  conservation  group  over  a
longer period of time. 09  Second, training programs  in conserva-
tion and environmental  sciences and  management  should be in-
cluded in  the conservation  program of the developing  countries.
Such programs could range from complex  technological matters,
for local experts,  to information applicable  to daily life, including
energy-efficient  cooking  techniques.  This  mechanism  should  fa-
cilitate  the  creation  of the  human  and  technical  infrastructure
necessary  to  strengthen  the  countries'  long-term  economic  and
natural resource base.  Habitat protection should also be a central
part of the agreement;  this  is  a  good way  to  provide  long-term
environmental  protection. 1  1O
Finally,  in some developing countries  there is,  in  effect, a dual
society of landed  elites and poor.  Debt-for-nature  trades  can be
structured to encourage the participation  of new, smaller conser-
vation groups along with the established  groups.  These fledgling
groups can thereby gain expertise and, importantly, provide alter-
native voices  to challenge the existing system of vested economic
108.  See French, supra note  8,  at  164.
109.  The use in the Ecuadoran  swap of nine-year bonds, and the allowance of three  to
four years for payment of the  cash owed under the Madagascar and Zambia swaps,  help to
accomplish this goal.  See  Fuller, supra note 84,  at  1451.
110.  See  Ryan, supra note  16,  at 23-26.1992] Economics  and  the Environment
interests  and  priorities,  many  of  which  threaten  the  environ-
ment."'I  Participation  of non-elite conservation  groups from de-
veloping  countries  can  enhance  the  likelihood  that  debt-for-
nature programs  reflect  the needs  of a wide cross section of the
peoples of developing countries.
We  conclude  that  through  such  strategies,  it  is  possible  to
structure debt-for-nature  trades in a way that responds to most of
the  traditional  objections.  So  structured,  such  trades  hold  out
considerable  promise  for  decreasing  debt  and  protecting  re-
sources  in ways  that benefit developing and developed  countries
alike.
Thus  far, the record  suggests  that debt-for-nature  swaps  have
produced  good  results  in  the  real  world." l2  Not  even  careful
structuring  of debt-for-nature  transactions,  however,  can  elimi-
nate all of the relevant problems.  One such defect,  noted above,
is  that  agreements  that  support  debt-for-nature  swaps  are  not
readily  enforceable,  which  is  a  serious  concern.' 13  Second,  we
have suggested  that potential parties, particularly  those financing
the  debt side of the equation,  are usually unable or unwilling  to
enter into these arrangements on a large scale." 4  Finally, mecha-
nisms  that  merely reduce  debt obligations  inadequately  address
11l.  For a discussion of WWF's efforts to accommodate the interests of non-elite devel-
oping  country conservation  groups,  see  Reed, supra  note  100.
112.  When measured in  terms of the amount of developing country conservation  funds
generated  per dollar  invested  by  international  NGOs or  other conservation  purchasers,
debt exchanges  prove to be a successful  means of leveraging conservation  financing.  For
example,  the  first  Ecuadoran  exchange  provided  $1,000,000  in conservation  funds,  at  a
cost to WWF of $354,000;  in the Zambia swap, WWF's $454,000 generated $2,270,000 for
conservation;  and in the 1990 Philippines exchange, WWF's $438,750 bought $900,000 in
conservation  funds.  See  WWF  SWAPS  TO  DATE,  supra note 70.
Other less quantifiable  indicia of the success  of debt-for-nature  swaps include  the con-
tinued,  ambitious employment  of this  device  by  an increasingly  diverse  array of parties,
including formerly  skeptical developing country governments, governments of developed
countries  and  their bilateral  aid  agencies,  and multilateral  development  banks.
Whether there have been significant  gains in environmental protection  is more difficult
to  assess.  In  most  cases,  it  is  simply too early  to discern  whether  debt-for-nature  swaps
have contributed  measurably to either local  or global  environmental  viability.  Initial au-
dits, however, have  been  positive. The WWF  in  March  1990 conducted  a  compliance re-
view of the  1988  Costa Rican  exchange and found that the funds from  the swap had been
"instrumental"  in supporting important  conservation program activities.  See  COSTA  RICAN
COMPLIANCE  REPORT,  supra note 93,  at 9  (concluding  that the results  of the swap  to date
were  positive).
113.  See Timothy  B.  Hamlin,  Debt-for-Nature Swaps:  A New  Strategy for Protecting Environ-
mental Interests in Developing Nations,  16  ECOLOGY  L.Q.  1065,  1085-87  (1989).
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both the immediate issue of stemming deforestation and the more
general problems of environmental degradation, because they do
not change  the incentives for engaging  in that behavior.  In Part
IV, we propose the possibility of taking steps that deal more effec-
tively with the problems of development  and environmental  deg-
radation in developing nations.
IV.  ENERGY  EFFICIENCY,  TECHNOLOGY,  AND  DEVELOPMENT
For developed  and developing countries  alike,  there is  a  basic
obstacle to environmental  protection,  energy independence,  and
economic  growth:  the absence  of widespread  implementation  of
techniques  for  energy  efficiency.  In  the  developing  countries  in
particular, inefficient technologies are a severe local problem, one
with  potentially  disastrous  consequences  for  both  particular
countries and the world as a whole."l 5  Most fundamentally, more
efficient  energy  output  will  allow  for  greater  development  at
lower cost.  For developing countries,  the closely linked problems
of poverty  and  development  find  a  valuable  if partial  solution
through energy  efficiency.
Any  strategy  for  using  economic  incentives  to  redress  these
problems would  have to begin with  an understanding  of the po-
tential  economic  and  environmental  advantages  of energy  effi-
ciency.  The short-term goal of such a strategy would be to ensure
dissemination  of  efficient  technologies.  Ultimately,  the  effort
would be to promote the widespread  use of energy sources  other
than fossil fuels, which are the most important source of environ-
mental  degradation. 1 6  We  propose  an arrangement  - a  tech-
nology-for-nature  exchange  - designed  to  facilitate  these
economic  and environmental  goals.  We  discuss  the contours  of
such arrangements and suggest legal reforms to increase the effi-
115.  As one example of the historical  importance of technology to economic progress,
consider that technological  change is estimated to have accounted  for 90% of the produc-
tivity gains in  the United States economy between  1909 and 1949. See  GOLDEMBERG  ET  AL.,
supra note 21,  at 91.  For  a discussion of innovation  in  an integrated  world economy  and
the suggestion  that  integration  both  increases  the  incentives  for  and  the  benefits  from
innovation, see  PAUL  R.  KRUGMAN,  RETHINKING  INTERNATIONAL  TRADE  166-67  (1990).
116.  Eventually  it will  be necessary  for countries  now  dependent  on fossil fuels  to find
substitute energy sources, a conclusion shared by a wide variety of commentators.  See, e.g.,
BARRY  COMMONER,  MAKING  PEACE WITH THE  PLANET  191-210  (1989); Christopher Flavin &
Nicholas Lenssen, Designing a Sustainable  Energy System,  in STATE  OF  THE WORLD  1991,  supra
note 24,  at  21,  38; John  H.  Gibbons et  al.,  Strategies  for Energy  Use, in  MANAGING  PLANET
EARTH  85  (1990);  OPPENHEIMER  & BOYLE,  supra note 4,  at  175-206.Economics  and  the Environment
cacy of the proposed exchanges.  A particular problem  is the lack
of incentives to implement and distribute existing technologies  to
developing  countries;  we  attempt  to  respond  to  that  problem
here.
A.  Energy  Efficiency
Energy,  the  capacity  to  do  work,  is  indispensable  to  support
productive activity.  According to accepted wisdom, increased  en-
ergy consumption  is  a prerequisite  to economic  growth. 1 7  The
view  that consumption  and  development  are inextricably  linked
underlies  the  use of energy  consumption  as a  yardstick  for eco-
nomic  progress." l 8  Energy  efficiency  technologies  weaken  the
link  between  growth  and  increased  consumption.  It  is  for  this
reason that both scientists and policy makers have pointed to en-
ergy  efficiency  as  the  area  holding  the greatest  potential  for re-
turns  on  private  and  public  investments  that  will  advance  both
environmental  and developmental  goals." 19
1.  Definitions
Energy  efficiency  is  a  relative  term;  it  permits  comparison  of
the amount of energy input required  to produce a unit of output,
that  is, a  given quantum  of work,  goods,  services,  or prosperity.
For purposes  of assessing  the  overall  efficiency  with  which  a
country  uses  energy,  comparisons  are  often based  upon  energy
intensities - measurements of the amount of energy required per
increment  of gross national  product ("GNP") or  gross domestic
product ("GDP").120  In the  1980s, for example,  France required
about half as much primary energy to generate a dollar of GDP as
117.  GOLDEMBERG  ET  AL., supra note 21,  at  219-20.
118.  Id. at  2 ("So important  is energy  to human  society  that the magnitude  of energy
consumed per'capita became one of the indicators of a country's 'modernization.'  ").  Con-
sider,  too, the  history  of the  Soviet Union's  energy  policy,  which  traditionally  involved
subsidizing  supply  to  republics  and  satellites and  which  encouraged  consumption  as  a
measure of wealth and prosperity.
119.  See id. at 2-4,  63-65  (advocating a shift away  from  a supply-oriented approach  to
these problems  to one that  has its foundation  in energy efficient  end-use strategies).  See
also WORLD  COMMISSION  ON  ENVIRONMENT  AND  DEVELOPMENT,  Supra note  13,  at  174.
120.  See, e.g.,  Gibbons et al., supra note 116, at 85-97.  Cf. GOLDEMBERG  ET AL., supra note
21,  at  219-21  (cautioning against  emphasis  on GDP  as  indicator of economic  growth  in
context of energy planning  in developing  countries because  of tendency  to  skew  policy).
See  also  VANDANA  SHIVA,  STAYING  ALIVE:  WOMEN,  ECOLOGY  AND  DEVELOPMENT  6-8  (1989)
(criticizing use of measure of productivity, i.e. GNP, as measure of development and exam-
ining effect on ecosystem  and women in  developing countries).
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did the United  States.' 21  Europe's energy  intensity,  in  total pri-
mary  energy  requirements  per  GDP,  at  0.33  in  the  mid-1980s,
shows  it to  be a  far more  efficient  producer  than  Brazil,  whose
energy intensity was  0.58, and than Poland, whose energy  inten-
sity was  0.95.122
One formulation of the concept, particularly useful for making
comparisons  among different  technologies,  measures  how much
primary  energy  is required  by  a  given  process or end-use  to  do
work.  Thus, for example, one can compare the light energy out-
put, in lumens per unit of energy consumed in the lighting device,
of kerosene  lamps  and  electric  (incandescent)  light  bulbs:  the
electric  bulbs  produce  about  200  times  the  luminous  output  of
kerosene  lamps,  that is, they are about  200 times  as  efficient.123
2.  Experience  in  the Developed  World
The last two  decades have seen  dramatic and largely  unantici-
pated  increases  in  energy  efficiency  in  the  industrialized  world.
Energy  demand  projections,  made  in  the  1970s  by  the  United
States  Department  of Energy  and  by  the  International  Energy
Agency,  grossly  overestimated  primary  energy  supply  require-
ments  and  have  had to  be  revised  as  growth  in  energy demand
has slowed  throughout  the  1980s. 124  The failure in demand pro-
jections resulted in large part from the unexpected emergence  of
a wide  range of technologies  using much less  primary  energy  to
provide various  energy services.1 25
In many industrialized countries, energy efficiency  increased by
an average  of  1.7%  annually  between  1973  and  1983.126  In the
period  1978  to  1982,  the  final  energy  use  per  United  States
household decreased  by 30%, representing a 7.6%  per year aver-
age rate of decline. 27  According to one study, energy conserva-
tion  strategies  in  various  sectors  increased  energy  efficiency  by
2.5%  annually  between  the mid-1970s  and mid-1980s, with  esti-
121.  See GOLDEMBERG  ET  AL.,  supra note 21,  at 73-74.
122.  See  INTERNATIONAL  ENERGY  AGENCY,  ENERGY  IN  NON-OECD  COUNTRIES:  SELECTED
Topics  1988, at  47,  Table 30  (1988).
123.  See  GOLDEMBERG  ET  AL.,  supra note 21,  at 258.
124.  See id. at  78.
125.  Id. at 85.  A major factor contributing to this technological innovation was  the six-
fold increase in world oil prices following the oil crises of the  1970s.  Id.  See also BRITISH
PETROLEUM  COMPANY, supra note 38,  at  12-13.
126.  WORLD  COMMISSION  ON  ENVIRONMENT  AND  DEVELOPMENT,  supra note  13,  at  196.
127.  GOLDEMBERG  ET  AL.,  supra note 21,  at  169.Economics  and  the Environment
mated  savings  of over  $150  billion annually. 128  The  result has
been  carbon  dioxide, sulfur dioxide, and  nitrogen dioxide  emis-
sions reductions  of about 40%.129
Moreover,  there  is  great  potential  for  continued  energy  effi-
ciency  gains.  Much of the technology for such improvements  al-
ready  exists;  some  of  it  is  commercially  available.  Compact
fluorescent light bulbs, for example,  which use  18  rather than  75
watts  to  produce  the same  amount  of light  and  last  over  seven
times  as  long  as  conventional  bulbs,  are  currently  available.'
30
Compact fluorescent  lamps and similar products  could save  over
$25 billion annually,  and reduce hundreds of millions of tons  of
carbon  dioxide  emissions  while  providing  other  environmental
gains. 131
Although  the  average  refrigerator  now  in  use  in  the  United
States  uses 3.4 kilowatt-hours  of energy  per liter per year,  com-
mercially available alternatives  employing the best available tech-
nology use  1.3  to 1.7  kilowatt-hours per liter per year.  Advanced
prototypes would use 0.7 kilowatt-hours per liter per year.'3 2  Im-
proved windows  in American buildings  save about the equivalent
of an Alaska  pipeline  - 1.8  million oil barrels  each  day - and
new  windows  could  provide  large  additional  savings.' 33  Two
American  utilities  project  19%  reductions  over  the  next twenty
years  in  carbon  emissions  from  improved  energy  efficiency  in
buildings. 134
Steel  production  is  another  area where  energy  efficiency  can
produce  significant  results.  In  1979,  producers  in  the  United
States required 27 gigajoules  ("GJ") of final energy per ton of raw
steel.  Sweden's  average  in  1976  was  22  GJ.  The  best available
technology,  now  being  adapted  for commercial  use  in  Sweden,
would reduce  the amount of energy required to  15  GJ. Technol-
ogy now under development would bring this figure  down to be-
tween 9 and  12  GJ.13 5
128.  See Claudine Schneider, Energy Conservation, EPA JOURNAL,  Mar.-Apr.  1990,  at  11,
12.
129.  Id.
130.  Lester R.  Brown  et al.,  supra note 20,  at  180.
131.  Id.
132.  GOLDEMBERG  ET  AL.,  supra note 21,  at  87, Table  2.1.
133.  See Schneider, supra note  128, at  11-12.
134.  Flavin, supra note  27,  at 33.
135.  GOLDEMBERG  ET  AL.,  supra note 21,  at  87, Table 2.1.
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3.  Energy  Efficiency  and Global Warming
Carbon dioxide is  the  principal anthropogenic  cause of global
warming.13 6  As noted above, the rate of increase in carbon  diox-
ide  emissions of the industrialized  countries  of Western  Europe
and North America  decreased from about 3%  per year in the pe-
riod  1945  to 1972  to less than  1% per year in the period  1973 to
1984.  Carbon dioxide  emissions  from  developing countries, 'on
the other hand, are increasing  at a rate of 6%  per year.'37
The rate of growth of global carbon emissions has also declined
since  1973.  Fully one-third of the drop, or about  1.1  billion tons
of carbon,  can  be  traced  to  the  decreasing  energy  intensity  of
many  national  economies,  that  is,  to  increases  in  energy  effi-
ciency.  The  rising use of renewable  and  nuclear  sources  of en-
ergy played a smaller but still significant role in the decline.  If the
global expansion of emissions had continued at the pre-1973 rate,
annual  emissions today  would be almost  3 billion tons higher.'3 8
While world carbon  emissions  increased  from roughly  2.6 bil-
lion  tons  in  1960  to 5.6  billion tons in  1987,  the efficiency with
which carbon-containing  sources of energy were  used (measured
here  in  carbon  emissions  per  dollar  GNP)  increased  markedly
during the same period.  Thus, whereas 411 grams of carbon per
dollar  GNP  were  released  in  1960,  this  figure decreased  to 327
grams per dollar in 1987.13 9  The impact of improved energy effi-
ciency would have been much greater, however, had the consider-
able  gains  in  energy  efficiency  not  largely  bypassed  the
developing  world.  For  example,  the United  States,  the  United
Kingdom,  West  Germany,  and  France  all  realized  a decrease  in
carbon  emissions  per  dollar  GNP  averaging  173.5  grams  from
1960  to  1987.  During  that  same  period,  however,  the  carbon
136.  The  Intergovernmental  Panel  on  Climate  Change  ("IPCC") estimates  the  ex-
pected  contribution of carbon  dioxide  to  the radiative  forcing  of climate  change  to  be
611%.  (The contributions  of methane and  nitrous oxide are,  respectively,  17%  and 4%.)
These  figures  are  derived  by  multiplying  the  1990  emissions  rate  for  each  gas  by  its
"Global  Warming Potential," an index based upon such factors as the lifetime of the gas in
the atmosphere,  its molecular weight, the position and strength of the absorption bands of
the gas,  and the time period over which climate effects are of concern - in this calculation,
100 years. Thus, while carbon dioxide  is "weak"  relative to  the other  greenhouse  gases if
one measures  radiative forcing on a  molecule-per-molecule  or kilogram-per-kilogram  ba-
sis,  these comparisons  underestimate the influence of carbon dioxide on  global warming.
See  IPCC REPORT, supra note 32,  at 45-49,  61,  Table 2.9.  See generally id.  chs.  1-2.
137.  See  id. at 10.
138.  Flavin, supra note 27,  at  18-19.
139.  Id. at  19, Table  2-1.Economics  and  the Environment
emissions of India,  Nigeria,  Mexico,  and Egypt increased  on the
average  by 206  grams  per dollar GNP.' 40
Enormous  disparities  among  nations  persist.  In  1987,  Japan
emitted  only  156  grams  of carbon  per  dollar GNP;  the United
States released 276 grams of carbon per dollar GNP; Poland emit-
ted 492  grams of carbon per GNP;  Mexico,  609; India, 655; and
China, an astounding 2024 grams of carbon per dollar of GNP. 14'
Energy  efficiency  alone does not account  for these disparities.
The  composition  of primary  energy  sources  relied  upon  by  a
country also plays a significant role in the measurement of carbon
emissions per unit of GNP.  Carbon  emissions per unit of energy,
even  among  the  fossil  fuels,  varies  greatly.  Natural  gas  is  the
cleanest  fossil  fuel  in  terms  of carbon  emissions;  oil  contains
about 44%  more carbon per unit of energy than natural gas; coal,
about  75%  more. 42  China's  enormous  carbon  emissions  level
per  GNP  is  thus  due  in  part  to  its  heavy  dependency  on  coal,
which accounted for 76% of China's primary energy consumption
in  1989.143  France,  by  contrast,  emitted  only  133 grams  of car-
bon per dollar  GNP  in  1987,  an amount lower  than even  highly
efficient Japan. 44  This is  explained  in part by France's  decision
to encourage nuclear energy  as a source  of supply.  Nuclear en-
ergy in  1989  contributed just under 30%  to the total primary en-
ergy consumption  in France. 145
Energy efficiency  improvements,  however, have the immediate
potential  to reduce  fossil  fuel  consumption  in  industrialized  na-
tions  by at least  3%  annually.' 46  Global  implementation  of en-
ergy efficiency measures  from  1990 to 2010 could account for a 3
billion ton  difference in  the amount of carbon  released  into the
140.  Calculations based on id.  Note also  that in Eastern  Europe and the Soviet  Union
energy intensities remained essentially unchanged  in  the same period because both indus-
tries and consumers were insulated from the market incentives and pressures that induced
energy  efficiency  gains  elsewhere.  Soviet  per capita  carbon  emissions  were  almost  two
times the level of Western Europe, yet per capita economic  output was only two-thirds that
of Western  Europe.  Id.  at  19-20.
141.  Id. at  19,  Table 2-1.
142.  Id. at  22.
143.  Calculation  based  on BRrrIsH  PETROLEUM  COMPANY,  supra  note 38, at 34.
144.  Flavin,  supra note  27, at  19, Table  2-1.
145.  BRITISH  PETROLEUM  COMPANY,  supra  note 38, at  34.
146.  Flavin, supra  note 27,  at  23.
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atmosphere  each year. 147  Such widespread application  of energy
efficient  technologies  will be more likely if governments  help cre-
ate  economic incentives  - by  increasing  the cost of using fossil
fuels,  decreasing the price of clean, renewable sources  of energy,
or both.  Policies that accomplish this result through taxes or per-
mitting  systems  are an  especially  good strategy. 4 8  They  create
appropriate  incentives while leaving considerable flexibility to the
marketplace.  Several  governments  in  European  countries  have
proposed or enacted legislation  providing for a tax on carbon  di-
oxide  emissions. 
149
Because  industrialized  countries  are  the  largest  consumers  of
energy, the  total amount of energy saved  by  the implementation
of energy  efficiency  measures, and  the  commensurate  reduction
in  carbon  emissions,  will  be  greater  in  industrialized  countries
than elsewhere.  Developing nations, however,  have much  to gain
from increased energy  efficiency,  since  they are the least efficient
consumers of energy and the least efficient users of carbon-inten-
sive energy. 150  Developed and developing countries alike  should
welcome  the  decrease  in  carbon  emissions  produced  by  greater
efficiency  in developing countries.  Importantly,  as explained  be-
low,  increasing energy  efficiency  in developing countries also de-
stroys  the  link  between  energy  consumption  and  development.
For these reasons,  increased  energy efficiency  should not be lim-
ited to the industrialized  world.
147.  Id.  This estimate  assumes  a  3%  annual rate  of energy efficiency  improvement,  a
rate that Flavin  believes feasible  with the implementation  of currently  available efficiency
measures.
148.  See Ackerman  & Stewart, supra note  1, at  178-88  (discussing the benefits of permit-
ting systems).
149.  See  Flavin,  supra note  27,  at  33.  The  Netherlands,  for  example,  has  instituted  a
system combining  a  general  fuel  charge,  levied  as  an  excise  on petroleum  fuels,  natural
gas,  liquefied  petroleum  gas,  coal,  and coke,  with  a  rebate  program  whereby  industries
receive a  rebate  or credit  for  undertaking  approved  pollution  abatement activities.  The
revenues generated  by this system finance the majority of the government's environmental
programs.  See  NATURAL  ENDOWMENTS,  supra note  11,  at  22  (citing OECD,  ENVIRONMENT
DIRECTORATE,  THE  APPLICATION  OF  ECONOMIC  INSTRUMENTS  FOR  ENVIRONMENTAL  PROTEC-
TION  IN  OECD MEMBER  COUNTRIES:  DRAFT  FINAL  REPORT  (June 1988)).  The commission
of the European  Community has recently indicated  that it  plans to submit a formal propo-
sal  for  a Community-wide  energy tax.  Half of the tax  would be  in  the form of a  general
levy on energy generation  and half would be  based on the carbon content of a given fuel.
Commission Asked to Make Formal Proposal on Energy Tax to Address Climate Change, 14 Int'l  Envt.
Rep.  (BNA)  670  (Dec.  18,  1991).
150.  See  LEAN  ET AL.,  supra  note  17,  at  118;  INTERNATIONAL  ENERGY  AGENCY,  supra note
122, at 47,  Table 30.Economics  and  the Environment
4.  Energy  Efficiency and Developing  Countries
Without  energy  efficiency  technologies,  developing  nations
would  require  increasingly greater levels  of energy  consumption
in  order to  support their desire  to industrialize,  achieve a higher
standard of living, and accommodate a growing population.  The
potential  gains from  energy  efficiency  in  developing nations can
be  viewed  as  a  sort  of future  energy  source.  The  key virtue  of
energy  efficiency  is  that it promotes  economic  growth  in  a  way
that  simultaneously  allows  for environmental  protection  and en-
ergy  conservation.  At  the  same  time,  these  technologies  might
ultimately increase independence,  allowing developing nations  to
become more autonomous  of the developed  world.
Of course,  wide variations  exist  among  developing  countries
with respect  to  the  composition  of energy  supply,  the  level  and
kind of energy services available, and the extent of any infrastruc-
ture  and  distribution  network  now  in  place.  Some  energy  effi-
ciency  technologies  developed  for  application  in  industrialized
countries  will  be  suitable  for use  in  some  developing  countries
with only  minor adjustments.  Other developing  nations  will  re-
quire strategies  and technologies vastly  different from those now
used  in developed  countries.
In impoverished  areas of many developing  countries, available
technologies  could be employed  to harness  a  much greater  per-
centage of current  energy input, providing larger amounts of usa-
ble  energy  to  meet  basic  needs.  Currently  favored  cooking
methods  illustrate  the  present  connection  between  poverty  and
inefficient energy use.  Cooking in earthen pots over an open fire
uses  about eight  times  more  energy  than  aluminum pots  over  a
gas  stove.i 5i  The  distribution  of  aluminum  pots,  pressure
cookers, and fuel-efficient  wood stoves would bring about signifi-
cant gains in energy efficiency.' 52  Fuel-efficient wood  stoves have
been refined over traditionally employed models, using about half
as  much  firewood  per year.' 53  The  same $2  billion  required  to
finance the construction  of a single nuclear power plant could in-
stead fund the construction  of 200 to 400 million energy-efficient
stoves, at the current cost of $5  to $10  per stove - a number well
151.  See WORLD COMMISSION  ON  ENVIRONMENT  AND  DEVELOPMENT,  supra note  13, at 196.
152.  Id.
153.  GOLDEMBERG  ET  AL.,  supra note  21,  at  256.
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in excess of that required to equip all of the urban and rural poor
households  in India.1
54
In developing countries with more advanced  economies and in-
frastructures, there are also large potential gains from energy  effi-
ciency.  In  Brazil,  for  example,  the  electricity  sector  provides
numerous opportunities for efficiency  improvements.  Under the
guidance  of  a  national  electricity  conservation  -program
(PROCEL) established by the government in  1985, many of these
have been or are being implemented.  A detailed  study completed
in  1984 helped provide impetus for the government undertaking.
It indicated  that for a total investment of $10  billion in more effi-
cient  end-use technologies  - such  as  refrigerators,  street  light-
ing, and motors - it would be feasible to defer construction of 22
gigawatts of new  electrical supply capacity, which would have cost
an estimated  $44 billion. 155
The energy savings to date have been substantial.  By means of
a concerted installation effort in Brazil, for example,  PROCEL has
led to the replacement  of 280,000 incandescent  street lights with
mercury vapor and high pressure  sodium lamps, resulting in sav-
ings  of around  115  gigawatt-hours  ("GWh")  per year.'56  As  of
1989,  Brazil had  realized  overall  savings  of 1436  GWh per year
from  end-use  technologies  adopted. 157  Such measures  have  al-
ready  been  responsible  for  lowering  electricity  demand  in  that
country by about 0.5  to  1.2%  per year.'58
Ample opportunities  have been  identified  for future  improve-
ments in Brazil.  Audits of small and medium-sized industries  and
commercial  buildings  conducted  from  1987  to  1989  revealed
measures  that  could  cut  electricity  use  by  an  estimated  8  to
154.  Id.  at 364.
155.  See Christopher  Flavin, Electrifying the Third World, in STATE  OF THE  WORLD  1987,  at
81,  88-89  (Lester R.  Brown ed.,  Worldwatch  Institute  1987).
156.  Howard  S.  Geller  & Jose  R.  Moreira,  Brazil's  National  Electricity  Conservation
Program  (PROCEL):  Progress and  Lessons  5 (Dec.  1990)  (unpublished  paper,  available
from American Council for an Energy-Efficient  Economy, Washington,  D.C.).  In addition,
the use of more efficient refrigerators contributed a total annual savings of 383 GWh as of
1989.  Also  as of  1989,  the implementation  of various  other efficient  lighting  measures
resulted  in  a combined  electricity  savings of 644 GWh/year.  Id. at  19, Table  3.
157.  Id. at 19, Table  3.  Saving  1070  to  2500 GWh/year  in Brazil  is equivalent  to  the
power  typically supplied by  280 to 650  megawatts of hydroelectric  capacity.  Thus, with a
marginal cost of about $2000 per kilowatt, PROCEL has enabled utilities in Brazil to defer
investing $0.6 to 1.3  billion in new power plants, transmission lines, and distribution facili-
ties.  Id. at  7-8.
158.  Id. at  14.Economics  and  the Environment
15%.159  If refrigerator  and freezer manufacturers  were to  begin
producing only those models that achieved efficiency levels of the
best technology  available in  1993,  new refrigerators  and freezers
would by  1998 consume approximately one-half as much electric-
ity as  the average  of models produced  in  1990.160  The resulting
national  energy  savings  by  the year  2000  would  be about  5100
GWh per year. 16 1
B.  Beyond Efficiency: Alternative Energy Sources
For both developing  and developed  nations,  the ultimate goal
ranges beyond energy efficiency  to new technologies  having mini-
mal  adverse  environmental  consequences.  Current  efficiency
technologies  can be seen as a transition  stage before widespread
reliance on renewable  energy  sources and replacements  for envi-
ronmentally  harmful substances.' 62  Many  possibilities  now exist
for the use  of renewable  sources.  Because  of the  complexity  of
these issues,  we provide only  a brief outline here.
The  principal  renewable  sources  of energy  include  wind,  bio-
mass,  solar  thermal,  photovoltaic  cells,  and  geothermal.  These
sources now  supply about 20%  of the world's  energy,  and it  has
been  estimated  that  over  half of U.S.  energy  use could  be pro-
vided by renewables  as early as 2030.  Use of solar energy is espe-
cially  promising,  because  solar  rays  are free,  and  because  solar
energy  avoids the majority of highly polluting effects of fossil fu-
els and other sources of energy.  Today, solar thermal panels are
widely  used to  heat  water  in  Cyprus,  Israel,  and Jordan,  and  a
solar energy company in California  is now providing electricity  to
homes at competitive prices.' 63
Photovoltaic  cells,  which convert sunlight directly into electric-
ity, have considerable potential.  Technology  should be available
to  put these  cells  into general  use within  the next  few  decades,
and  their  cost  is  falling  rapidly,  from  $30  per  kilowatt-hour  in
1971  to about 30 cents today. They can be used to accomplish  all
of the  tasks  of fossil  fuels.  This  technology  is  already  in  wide-
159.  Id. at  3.
160.  Id. at  6.
161.  Id. at  6-7.
162.  See OPPENHEIMER & BOYLE,  supra note 4,  at 175-206;  COMMONER,  supra note 116, at
191-243.
163.  Flavin  & Lenssen, supra note  116,  at 26-28.
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spread  use  in some rural areas  in  the Third World.  In India, for
example,  more than 6000 villages  now use them.'6
There  has  been  dramatic  progress  with  other  renewables  as
well.  Over the last decade wind power has fallen in price from 30
cents to 8 cents  per kilowatt-hour,  and wind-produced  electricity
is  now receiving considerable  use  in California.  Northern Africa
and  southern  South  America  in  particular  could  benefit  from
wind power, using it in the short-term  for more than 20% of their
energy.  About a fifteenth of the world's  electricity  is now gener-
ated  by  hydropower,  and  there  is  considerable  potential  for
growth here as well. 165  Biomass energy is used - through primi-
tive technologies and with considerable environmental harm - to
provide over three-quarters  of the energy for several countries in
Africa. 166  Though  not  strictly renewable,  geothermal  energy  -
based  on  the heat of the earth's  core  - is  used  in  El  Salvador,
Nicaragua,  and Kenya. 167
It  is  especially  significant  that  developing  nations  frequently
have  abundant  supplies  of renewable  energy  resources.  Indeed,
one of the most attractive  aspects of energy  sources such  as  sun
and wind is that  they are  more equitably  distributed on a  global
basis  than are  the  known fossil  fuel reserves.  These natural  ad-
vantages  remain  insufficient,  however,  in  the  absence  of proper
incentives,  investment  capital,  and  appropriate  technology.  It is
here that the international  community  might provide  the neces-
sary assistance  to develop  renewable  sources  of energy.
The picture that emerges,  then,  is one  in which  enormous  op-
portunities exist for enlisting energy efficiency and other technol-
ogies  to  improve  the  outlook  for  local  and  global  energy
requirements,  while  simultaneously  addressing  environmental
and developmental  problems.  As mentioned above, the principal
advances in energy efficiency technologies  have taken place in de-
veloped  countries.  If the potential  gains  from  energy  efficiency
are to be realized on a global level,  the solutions  must not avoid
164.  Id. at 28.
165.  See  BRITISH  PETROLEUM  COMPANY,  supra note 38,  at  34;  GOLDEMBERG  ET AL.,  supra
note  21,  at  378-80.  There  are,  however,  environmental  barriers  to reliance  on hydro-
power, which impairs conservation  efforts.  See  GOLDEMBERG  ET AL.,  supra note 21,  at 378-
80.
166.  Here it is especially  important to provide  better and  more efficient  methods,  be-
cause  biomass  places  a  severe stress  on agTicultural  resources.  See  GOLDEMBERG  ET  AL.,
supra note 21,  at  226-31.
167.  Flavin  & Lenssen,  supra note  116,  at 30.Economics  and the Environment
developing countries, especially in light of their grossly inefficient
practices  and  the  local  and  global  costs  of their  environmental
degradation.  Ecological limitations  and  economic needs suggest
that  developing  nations  should  implement  existing  energy  effi-
ciency technologies  and encourage the development of means to
use alternative  renewable  sources of energy.
The question is, therefore, how to develop arrangements which
facilitate  the worldwide  use of energy  technologies  that  limit  or
reduce environmental  degradation.
C.  Technology-For-Nature Trades
We  suggest  an altogether novel  kind  of exchange.  Developed
nations would  transfer economically  and environmentally  sound
technologies  to  developing  countries.  In  turn,  the latter would
agree  to  protect  natural  resources.  Specifically,  the  exchanges
would involve the transfer of energy technology from an industri-
alized  country in return for a commitment  from a developing na-
tion to stem deforestation  and to protect biological diversity.
Trades  of this  kind  would  provide  an  exceptionally  powerful
tool for promoting development  in  poor countries,  while  at the
same  time contributing  to the  solution  of local and  global  envi-
ronmental  problems.  For  developing  nations,  they  offer  not
merely  a minor  reduction  in debt, but an opportunity  to ensure
that  economic  growth  proceeds  in  an environmentally  responsi-
ble  manner.  They would  enable  developing  countries  to  avoid
becoming  dependent  on  energy  sources  that  have  created  so
many  environmental  problems  for  the  industrialized  world.  At
the same time, they would save energy costs while permitting the
energy use that is indispensable to development.  In short, trades
of technology  for  nature  have  greater long-term  potential  than
debt-for-nature  swaps  to accomplish  all  the relevant  goals.
More specifically,  the proposed exchange would yield dramatic
and  long-term  environmental  and  developmental  benefits.  It
would  seek  to improve upon  the  benefits  to  be gained  from the
"debt"  side of the debt-for-nature  equation by transferring  to the
developing nation something that provides  not immediate, short-
term economic relief, but instead facilitates  the recipient nation's
long-term  economic  growth and political and economic indepen-
dence.  The  transfer  of  energy  technology  in  particular  is
designed  to  take advantage of the  enormous  current opportuni-
ties for increasing  energy efficiency,  while allowing  growth to re-
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main at least constant.168  These arrangements  would enable  the
recipient nation  to become  a more  efficient consumer of energy,
regardless of the source, and therefore  to increase  the prospects
for economic development.  These swaps could also facilitate  the
research,  development,  and application  of renewable  sources  of
energy particularly  suited  to the debtor country's  needs.  Impor-
tantly,  such  arrangements  would  contribute  to  the  increase  in
technological  capacity and research infrastructure  in the develop-
ing nation.
This reduced dependence on non-renewable  sources of energy
would,  in  turn,  increase  the  benefits  on  the nature  side  of the
equation.  Diminished  demands on, for example,  wood from  the
forests as  a  source of fuel would reduce deforestation,  ideally to
the point of sustainable use.  Economic pressures, moreover, that
overtax the natural  resource  base will  be relieved  in  some mea-
sure, as less energy input will be required to produce a given level
of economic  output,  thereby freeing  capital  to be  redirected  to-
wards  addressing the underlying  causes of environmental  degra-
dation.  Moreover, the continued development and use of energy-
efficient technologies could reduce, on a worldwide basis, depen-
dence  on environmentally  harmful  fossil fuels.  Some developing
countries  might eventually  become exporters of efficient  end-use
technology or of surplus electricity generated from renewable pri-
mary  energy  sources.
We propose  a  trade of technology  for nature, but  it is impor-
tant to point out that there are  strong justifications for requiring
industrialized nations to transfer technology  to developing coun-
tries for free.  Such measures might be required under some ver-
sions  of theories  positing  a right to  access  by all  nations to  the
universal heritage of technology. 169  They  might also be justified
on the view that industrialized nations  have incurred  such a duty
because of their past and present irresponsible energy  consump-
168.  The idea here is  that because developing nations use inefficient energy  technolo-
gies, they have high energy intensities.  The potential for a developing nation to reduce its
energy intensity by  employing energy efficient technologies already in existence is  there-
fore great, and can be viewed as a sort of future energy resource possessed in a dispropor-
tionate amount  by developing nations.  See supra part  IV(A).
169.  This right  is  asserted, for  example, in  the Declaration on  the Establishment of a  New
International Economic  Order, G.A. Res.  3201,  U.N. GAOR Special Ad Hoc Comm.,  6th Spe-
cial Sess., Agenda Item  7, at  3,  U.N. Doc. A/9556 (1974),  reprinted in  13 I.L.M. 715 (1974).Economics  and  the Environment
tion. 170  Measures  to  ensure  that  technological  advances  extend
to  developing  countries  might  be  required  as  a quid pro quo  for
demands that developing countries join international agreements
to limit environmentally harmful practices. 17   A grant of technol-
ogy might also be based on the view that the global need for tech-
nologies  is  in  large  part  a  function  of  environmental  hazards
unleashed  by productive forces from which industrialized nations
have  disproportionately  benefitted.
The  argument for  such  a  grant might be  straightforwardly  re-
distributive  in character,  referring to the extraordinary  wealth  of
some  nations  in  comparison  with  others,  the  injustice  of such
large  disparities,172  and  the  moral  duty of those who  are  in  an
unjustly  superior position  to share their technological  capacities
with others  who need them.  Finally,  this view might be founded
on  the idea  that industrialized  nations  have  a  good  deal  to gain
from the development of improved energy technologies  through-
out the  world, namely, reduced  aggregate pollution.
For present purposes,  we  take  no  position  on  these  complex
questions.  A  principal  difficulty  with  making  technology  freely
available  is that it may diminish incentives  to create the technol-
170.  Statistics  support  this justification  and  underscore  the inequity  of current  world
disparities in energy use:  per capita oil consumption  in the United States for snowmobiles
and recreational boats and vehicles,  the equivalent of 1.6 GJ/year, is almost as much as per
capita  oil use in India  for all  purposes, which  is  1.8 GJ/year.  GOLDEMBERG  ET AL.,  supra
note 21,  at  191.  The average citizen of Bangladesh consumes less than  1.5%  of the energy
used by his or her United States counterpart.  In  especially striking terms, the energy con-
tent in the food eaten by an average North American is greater than the total energy used
by  a Bangladeshi  for all  purposes.  Id.
171.  This  view  finds  support, for  example,  in  Principle  12  of the  Declaration  of the
REPORT OF  THE UNITED  NATIONS  CONFERENCE  ON  THE HUMAN  ENVIRONMENT at 4, U.N.  Doc.
A/CONF.48/14/Rev.l,  U.N.  Sales  No.  E.73.II.A.14  (1972)  ("Resources  should be made
available  to  preserve  and  improve  the  environment,  taking  into  account  . . . any  costs
which may  emanate from [developing  countries] incorporating environmental  safeguards
into their development  planning and  the need  for  making  available to  them, upon  their
request, additional  international  technical and financial  assistance for  this purpose.").  See
also EXPERTS  GROUP  ON  ENVIRONMENT  LAW  OF THE  WORLD  COMMISSION  ON  ENVIRONMENT
AND  DEVELOPMENT,  FINAL  REPORT  OF  THE  EXPERTS  GROUP  ON  ENVIRONMENTAL  LAW  ON
LEGAL  PRINCIPLES  FOR  ENVIRONMENTAL  PROTECTION  AND  SUSTAINABLE  DEVELOPMENT
(1986),  reprinted  in EXPERTS  GROUP  ON  ENVIRONMENT  LAW  OF THE  WORLD  COMMISSION  ON
ENVIRONMENT  AND  DEVELOPMENT,  ENVIRONMENTAL  PROTECTION AND  SUSTAINABLE  DEVELOP-
MENT:  LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND  RECOMMENDATIONS  35,  65-69 (1987)  (Article 7 and accompa-
nying comment).  For a discussion  of requests  made  by India and China for  transfers  of
technology  and  capital  assistance  to  offset  the  costs  of adopting  the  alternatives  to
chlorofluorocarbons  necessary  to meet  the terms of the Montreal  Protocol on Substances
That Deplete  the Ozone  Layer,  see NATURAL  ENDOWMENTS,  supra note  11,  at  22.
172.  See generally THOMAS  W.  POGGE,  REALIZING  RAWLS  (1990).
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ogy in the first place.  For this reason,  one might expect  govern-
ments  in  developed  countries  to  provide  compensation  to
industries  with  the  relevant  technology,  and  then  to ensure that
the technology  is  given  to developing countries  for free or for a
below-market  price.  Such  an  approach  introduces  some  of the
complexities  in a technology-for-nature  trade. 73
1.  Diffusion  of Technology
There  are many  approaches  for ensuring the  dissemination  of
energy  technology  throughout  the  developed  and  developing
world.  Some argue that  the diffusion  of technology  via market-
driven mechanisms  should not be hampered by government poli-
cies  and  private  practices  inconsistent  with  ordinary  free  mar-
kets. 174  Others  counter  that  the  necessary  global  transition  to
efficient  and  environmentally  sound  energy  practices  cannot  be
instituted  without some  combination  of interventionist  devices,
such  as  technology  transfer,  subsidies,  and  loans  to developing
countries. 175  Because  the  benefits  of energy  efficiency  are  not
fully internalized through markets, it seems clear that any sensible
strategy  must  employ  a  mixture  of market  and  non-market  ap-
proaches.  In any case, we believe that an exchange of technology
for  nature could  play a  significant  role  in  any  large-scale  set  of
initiatives  for disseminating energy technology.
The  transfer  of  technology  from  developed  to  developing
countries  has historically  elicited  two principal  objections.  Both
objections  turn out  to be versions of the same  fundamental  con-
cern,  namely,  the  possible  insensitivity  of  transferors  to  the
unique  situation and needs  of each  developing country.
The first  objection  is  that technology  developed  for use in  an
industrialized country  may be ill-suited,  and perhaps  even harm-
ful,  for  use  in  a  particular  developing  nation.  This  criticism  is
based  largely  on  experience  in  an  era  when  most  technology
transfers occurred only in conjunction with the sale of equipment
173.  In  discussing those complexities,  and proposing  such trades,  we do  not mean  to
deny  that a  grant of technology  might be desirable  in some  contexts.  On  the  contrary,
many of the considerations that we explore bear on such  grants  as  well.
174.  For  a  summary  of market  imperfections  and  distortions particular to  the energy
sector, and for  a  suggestion  of reforms  in national pricing policies, see  GOLDEMBERG  ET
AL.,  supra note  21,  at 325-28,  339- 40.
175.  See generally id. at  322-69.Economics  and  the  Environment
by private enterprises  from industrialized nations. 176  This sort of
transfer  is  not  representative  of the  broad  array  of technology
transfers possible,77 nor of the transfers  that we envision.  None-
theless, the criticism provides an important warning:  parties  to a
technology  transfer must ensure the suitability of the technology
for the recipient country.
This  seemingly  obvious  requirement  might  easily  be  over-
looked.  The tendency to assume that technological  advancement
is  tantamount  to  increased  consumption,  and  that  the  needs  of
the  developing countries  replicate  those of the developed  world
at an earlier  stage in its  industrialization, might  lead to the crea-
tion of programs  with perverse effects.  The problem  here is  not
only the  opportunity  costs of the misdirected  resources  but also
the exacerbation  of existing problems  in the developing  country.
Thus, for example,  a transfer that involves  technology  encourag-
ing  centralized  energy  supply  systems  might add  to  an already
overcrowded  urban  population  concentration.  It  may also  con-
tribute to the entrenching of the "dual  society"  of many develop-
ing  countries,  as  the  urban  elite  approach  the  consumption
patterns of developed countries  while the needs of the rural poor
are  not addressed.1
78
Another example of inappropriate  technology exacerbating ex-
isting problems involves transfers that are insensitive to the effect
of the new  technology  in  displacing economic  activity.  Transfer
of certain technologies  to countries with high unemployment can
be destructive if they contribute  to that problem  and fail to capi-
talize  on the abundance  of labor.' 79  This is  a special  concern  in
light  of the  fact  that  some  advanced  technology  is  especially
176.  See  David  Dichter &  Klaus  Netter, A  New  Look at Foreign Investment, in  UNITED  NA-
TIONs  DEP'T  OF  PUBLIC  INFO.,  DEVELOPMENT  FORUM  (Sept.-Oct. 1988)  ("Early in  the post-
colonial period, the most significant  technology transfers were made to developing coun-
tries  by subsidiaries  of [transnational corporations] ....  No  special considerations  were
made of Third World differences....  Important  technical information  was withheld from
recipient countries.").
177.  Id.
178.  See  GOLDEMBERG  ET  AL.,  supra note  21,  at  219-21.  In  India,  for example,  about
88%  of rural households  depend entirely  on kerosene for their lighting needs,  and while
the  number of unelectrified villages  is decreasing,  the number  of unelectrified  homes  is
increasing.  Id. at  258-60.
179.  In  the Indian state of Karnataka,  in 1978 to  1979,  20 industries consumed  nearly
69%  of the state's electricity output and  contributed less  than  8%  of industrial employ-
ment  (18,270  people),  whereas about  615 other industries  consumed about 31%  of elec-
tricity  output and employed 217,027 people.  Id.  at 223-24 & Table 3.14.
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adapted for large, energy-intensive,  labor-saving industries rather
than smaller, labor-intensive  industries. 80
The  second  common  objection  to  technology  transfer  is  that
some forms of transfer perpetuate the dependence  of developing
countries  rather  than  encouraging  their  long-term  self-reliance
and genuine growth.  In the area of energy technology,  this criti-
cism  arose in  response  to past  development  aid projects,  which
were  often conceived,  constructed,  and  managed  by  policy mak-
ers,  engineers,  and  consultants  from  the  developed  world.' 8'
When  these  workers  returned to  their developed  countries,  any
expertise  and  experience  gained  in  the  process  was  also  effec-
tively repatriated.  The project  left  a new  generating facility,  for
example, in the developing nation, but contributed  little to its ac-
quisition of human  technical capacity  or to  the  foundations  of a
research infrastructure.
This objection points to the same remedy as the first.  Participa-
tion and  involvement  on the part  of the developing country,  in-
cluding  its researchers  and  NGOs,  is  crucial  in  all  stages  of the
project, from conception  to implementation.  The substance  and
shape of the project should be a product  of both nations, rather
than dictated by one to another.  Transfer arrangements that take
the form  of a joint research  effort between developed and  devel-
oping countries  probably best accommodate  this concern.
The response  to  both  criticisms,  then,  is  not  that  technology
should  never  be  transferred,  but  instead  that  transfer  arrange-
ments  should be crafted  so  as  to observe  the imperative  of local
involvement  in  all  cases.  Transfers  should,  moreover,  be  fash-
ioned with an eye toward achieving  long-term technological  self-
reliance, and  thus  stability and growth, for developing nations.
2.  Exchanging Technology  for Nature  •
The concept  of an exchange  or trade of energy technology  for
nature encompasses  a  broad array  of arrangements.  Exchanges
falling under this heading might occur, for example,  in the  con-
text  of intergovernmental  agreements  concerning  environment
and development.  In this case one or both sides of the bargain -
that  is,  the commitment  to  transfer  technology  or  the commit-
ment  to  promote  environmental  protection  - might  be  under-
180.  See  id. at 223.
181.  SeeJoannides, supra note  l1,  at  175-76.Economics  and  the Environment
taken in fulfillment of a party's  obligations under the  terms of an
existing intergovernmental  agreement.'82
Technology-for-nature  exchanges  might  also  be  initiated  by
NGOs,  wholly  outside  of any  intergovernmental  commitments.
These  would  resemble  the  debt-for-nature  arrangements  cur-
rently  in place.  Finally, some versions  of the proposed exchange
might involve a hybrid.  For example, a developing country might
undertake  specific  measures .under an  international  convention
concerning  the sustainable  use of forests.  These  measures  may
be considered  to fulfill its obligations under the nature side of the
proposed exchange, while the technology side might be arranged
outside  of  any  governmental  obligation  to  provide  the
technology.
In discussing  the proposed exchange of technology for nature,
we  do not attempt  to describe  all of the  possible  arrangements
and actors.  Indeed,  it would  be a  mistake  to saddle  the  parties
with a rigid formula.  We seek instead to set forth the basic frame-
work and to encourage  the parties involved  to fashion appropri-
ately the  contours of the arrangements.
a.  The Parties:  Roles and Interests
The roles and interests of some of the parties would be similar
to those in current debt-for-nature  swaps,183  but some additional
182.  There is great potential for the proposed  exchanges to serve as a vehicle for trans-
lating  the  language  of such  international  obligations  into  forceful  commitments.  This
function  is likely  to be increasingly  critical  as international agreements contemplate  com-
prehensive approaches  to  the concerns  of environment  and  development,  and as  provi-
sions  for  technology  transfer  and  other  forms  of cooperation  between  developed  and
developing  nations move from the realm of principle to that approaching legal  obligation.
Consider, in this regard,  the provision for technology transfer in Article 5 of the amended
Montreal Protocol, supra note 6, 26 I.L.M. at  1555-56, and the importance of this provision
in securing  the signature of such countries as India,  see  French, supra note 8, at  160-61;
consider  also  the  movement  from  the  1972  United  Nations  Conference  on  the  Human
Environment  ("UNCHE"),  supra note  171,  to the  1992 United Nations Conference on En-
vironment  and  Development,  see Preparatory Committee for the  United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development, U.N.  Doc.  A/CONF.151/PC/61  (1991),  and  from  the  inclu-
sion  of Principle  12  in the Stockholm Declaration resulting from UNCHE,  mentioning  the
need for "international  ...  technical assistance,"  REPORT OF  THE  UNITED  NATIONS  CONFER-
ENCE  ON  THE  HUMAN  ENvIRONMENT,  supra note  171,  at 4,  to the anticipated  inclusion  in
some of the international  agreements  resulting from  the latter  of specific  provisions  for
technology transfer.
183.  The  basic  parties  to the  proposed  exchanges  would  likely  include:  a  sponsoring
international environmental  group or other international broker  (perhaps an international
NGO  with  expertise  in  energy  policy);  a  source  of technology  and  possibly  researchers
from the developed  country;  an energy  organization  or project,  including researchers,  in
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parties,  and new roles for existing ones, would become necessary
in  at least some technology-for-nature  exchanges.
As  we  envision  it, the  international  broker - probably  an  in-
ternational NGO  or group of NGOs  with  experience in the areas
of energy and environment  - would often orchestrate  the trans-
action.  Regardless  of the  source of the  project's  initial impetus,
the broker would  perform  the important  function  of identifying
appropriate  participants,  particularly  in  the  developing country.
Ideally,  the  broker  would itself be  a  cooperative  effort  between
organizations  from the  developed  and developing  country.  The
interests  of such  a  broker  should be  connected  to  the mutually
advantageous  results  to  be  brought  about by  completion  of the
exchange.
Yet this alignment  alone might  not be sufficient  to warrant the
large  investment  of effort  demanded  of the  broker by  the com-
plexity of the transaction.  In addition to the interests common to
all  participants  in  the  exchange,  the  international  organization
must  see  that  there  will  be  significant  benefits  over  alternative
uses  of its  resources.  This criterion  is  likely to be met, however,
because of the distinctive interplay of gains in the related areas of
energy conservation,  economic  development,  and environmental
protection  resulting  from  technology-for-nature  trades.  These
gains are not as obvious or as readily quantifiable  as  the leverag-
ing of conservation dollars, which provides  the impetus  for orga-
nizational  participation  in  debt-for-nature  transactions.  But the
return  on  a  broker's  investment  is  potentially  far-reaching  and
great.  In addition,  governments  may well  enlist the services  and
expertise of such organizations  in  order  to fulfill  obligations  for
technology transfer or technological  resource contribution under
the  terms of international  agreements.  NGOs  may  therefore  be
able in some cases  to secure funding from governmental  sources.
An NGO from the developing country, particularly one with an
energy focus, might perform several critical functions.  Regardless
of whether it is active in the overall orchestration as the broker, it
might  play  an  important  role  as  counterpart  to  the  developed
country  NGO  in conceptualizing  the  project and identifying  ap-
propriate  participants  from  its country  or region.  As experience
the  developing  country;  the  government  of the  developing  country;  and  a  developing
country  conservation  organization.  The arrangement  would  also likely require participa-
tion  by  the  developed  country  government  or, perhaps,  by  bilateral  or multilateral  aid
agencies.Economics  and  the  Environment
in the debt-for-nature  context has shown, much of the success  of
the exchange  depends  on  local  involvement  at each  stage in the
process  from  inception  to  implementation. 84  The  developing
country  NGO  might  itself be involved  in  energy  research,  or  it
might be concerned with energy and environmental  issues.  Both
types  of  NGO  would  be  capable  of  combining  the  necessary
knowledge of local conditions  and needs with  the ability to solicit
local researchers.
The developing country NGO  might in some cases be made re-
sponsible for any training and educational activities created  to en-
sure dissemination and  implementation  of the  technology.  Such
a system would presumably serve the interests of the organization
on several fronts.  It would provide  the means for the immediate
realization of improvements  in meeting energy  requirements  for
development, strengthen local technological  and  research capac-
ity,' and  create  progress  toward  long-term  economic  health and
environmental viability.
The  developing  country  government  would  participate  in  a
technology-for-nature  exchange  in much  the same capacity  as  in
the debt-for-nature  context.  Additional  facets  to  this participa-
tion would  likely be required  as a  result of government  involve-
ment  in the energy sector.
The interests of the developing country in furthering economic
development  and  environmental  aims  would  be  well  served  by
such  a transaction.  Indeed, as  discussed above,  the potential for
mutually reinforcing gains from a comprehensive approach is crit-
ical to the realization of either goal.  The developing country gov-
ernment should welcome the opportunity to redirect the financial
resources that otherwise would have been used to increase energy
supply  to meet growing demands.  Indeed,  such resources  could
be  devoted  to the  conservation  programs  undertaken  as  part of
the  technology-for-nature  transaction.  In  some  cases,  the devel-
oping country  government  may  become  better  able to  fulfill  its
obligations  under  international  environmental  agreements,
thereby increasing the likelihood  of observance by developed na-
tions of the same  agreements.
It  is  conceivable  that  such  arrangements  could  occur  without
participation  from  the  government  of  the  developed  country.
The  addition of that  government  to the cast  would, however,  be
184.  See  supra  notes  103-11  and accompanying  text.
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highly beneficial, primarily in order to provide incentives to those
conducting  research  in  energy  technology.  Indeed,  such  ex-
changes  might  not be  feasible without  the  involvement  of these
governments.  The  funding  required  may  often  exceed  the  re-
sources of private organizations, and private industry has little in-
centive  to  participate  independently  in  technology  transfers  at
below-market prices.  Developed country governments could "pro-
vide tax incentives or subsidies, or establish an award program for
researchers  who  develop  technology  for  transfer or  who  other-
wise cooperate  with researchers  in a developing nation.  The de-
veloped  country could  also  procure  technology directly  in order
to influence the market in the direction of efficient and renewable
energy technologies.  Finally, the government  might engage in re-
search  on  its  own,  with  the idea  that the  fruits  of such  research
would  not  only  be  employed  in  the  home  country  but  also  be
available for transfer  to developing nations.
Governments  of industrialized  countries might be interested in
participating in such transactions as part of their development aid
programs,  on  concessional  terms,  or  for  free.  In any  of these
cases,  the  proposed  technology-for-nature  exchange  offers
greater opportunities than debt-for-nature agreements for return
on their investment, for the same reasons that it offers this oppor-
tunity to  the brokers  of the transaction.  In addition, obligations
for technology transfer and scientific cooperation  are likely to be
included  in  an  increasing  number  of intergovernmental  agree-
ments.  The  arrangement  we  propose  would  furnish  a  useful
mechanism  for  meeting  these  obligations.  The  proposed  ex-
change would  also  increase  the likelihood  that the provisions  of
such agreements  will be - and can be - observed by developing
countries.
b.  The  Commitments:  Nature and Technology
It is  difficult and perhaps  unwise to attempt to specify the sub-
stance of the  commitments  of the  proposed  exchange  in  a  vac-
uum,  that  is,  removed  geographically,  culturally,  and  temporally
from  the particular  context of the  exchange.  As  is  evident from
the  wide  range  of environmental  commitments  selected  by  the
parties  to the various  debt-for-nature  swaps,' 85  the needs  of the
parties  will vary greatly  from  country  to  country or from project
185.  See supra  part  III(A).Economics  and  the Environment
to project.  Indeed,  it  is  this flexibility,  and the potential for  the
parties  to fashion  appropriate variations,  that  constitutes  one of
the strengths of these  arrangements  as  a tool for serving  the in-
terests of all involved.
Nevertheless, we offer a few suggestions of the sorts of commit-
ments  that  might  be  suitable  for  technology-for-nature  ex-
changes.  In  particular,  we  identify  some  of  the  energy
technologies  that might be the subject of such  exchanges.  In  so
doing, we  draw upon  a  recent but growing body  of work  being
done in this area, in both developed and developing countries. 1 86
In the  process  of describing  the  mechanics  of debt-for-nature
swaps, we  have  mentioned  some of the  commitments  that might
be undertaken  on the nature side of the transaction.'8 7  The pos-
sibilities  for this  portion  of the proposed  technology-for-nature
transaction would be similarly numerous and limited  only by  the
requirements  of the individual  parties.
In the process  of describing the potential for energy  efficiency,
we  have also touched  on some of the technologies  that might be
appropriate  in some areas.' 8  Efficient wood stoves, for example,
could be widely employed  in countries that rely on wood to meet
basic  cooking needs.  Similarly, projects  like those undertaken  in
Brazil  might be appropriate  in other countries  where  a similarly
developed  infrastructure  exists,' 8 9  where  governments  have  be-
186.  See, e.g.,  GOLDEMBERG  ET  AL., supra note 21  (United States,  Sweden,  India,  Brazil);
MICHAEL  PHILIPS, INTERNATIONAL  INSTITUTE  FOR ENERGY  CONSERVATION,  ENERGY  CONSER-
VATION  ACTIVITIES  IN  AFRICA  AND  EASTERN  EUROPE  (Sept.  1990)  (Ivory  Coast,  Senegal,
Tunisia,  Egypt,  Hungary, Yugoslavia,  and Turkey);  MICHAEL  PHILIPS,  INTERNATIONAL  IN-
STITUTE FOR  ENERGY  CONSERVATION,  ENERGY  CONSERVATION  ACTIVITIES  IN  ASIA  (Sept.
1990)  (China, Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, India, and Pakistan)  [hereinafter  CONSER-
VATION  IN  ASIA]; MICHAEL  PHILIPS,  INTERNATIONAL  INSTITUTE  FOR  ENERGY  CONSERVATION,
ENERGY  CONSERVATION  ACTIVITIES  IN  LATIN  AMERICA  AND  THE  CARIBBEAN  (June  1990)
(Brazil,  Argentina,  Chile, Costa  Rica,  and Jamaica)  [hereinafter  CONSERVATION  IN  LATIN
AMERICA  AND  THE  CARIBBEAN];  Geller & Moreira, supra note  156  (noting the potential for
energy conservation  in Brazil).  Many possibilities for  energy efficiency  have been  identi-
fied  in various  studies and reports by the Energy Sector Management  Assistance Program
("ESMAP"),  many of which are  discussed  in MICHAEL  PHILIPS,  INTERNATIONAL  INSTTrrUTE
FOR  ENERGY  CONSERVATION,  ALTERNATIVE  ROLES  FOR  THE  ENERGY  SECTOR  MANAGEMENT
ASSISTANCE  PROGRAM  IN  END-USE  ENERGY  EFFICIENCY  (Oct.  1990)  (Working Draft).
187.  See supra part  I1(A).
188.  See supra part  IV(A)(4).
189.  Projects  successful  in  India  are  often  emulated  by  other developing  countries.
TATA  ENERGY  RESEARCH  INSTITUTE  &  INTERNATIONAL  INSTITUTE  FOR  ENERGY  CONSERVA-
TION,  PROPOSAL TO  INITIATE  PLANNING  FOR  A  Low  CFC,  HIGH  EFFICIENCY  REFRIGERATOR
FOR  MANUFACTURE  IN  INDIA  1 (Oct.  1990)  (unpublished paper,  available  from  the IIEC.
Washington,  D.C.).  Dissemination  of technology  via  this  route,  from  one  developing
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gun  to understand  the benefits of pursuing demand-side  or end-
use planning over purely supply-side planning for their countries'
increasing  energy  needs,  and  where  various  organizations  are
demonstrating  an  interest  in  cooperating  in  such  programs.
19 0
Efficient  end-use  technologies  for  lighting,  refrigeration,  and
transportation  are  but  a  few  of  the  likely  candidates  for  such
exchanges.
The  task  for the  parties  to transfers  involving  these  or similar
technologies  is  to  design  and  implement  distribution  networks,
and to conduct necessary  informational and educational activities
in order to ensure dissemination  of the relevant technology.  Any
modification  necessary  to  tailor  such technologies  to the  area in
which they will be implemented could be undertaken primarily by
local engineers familiar  with the area's people and culture, work-
ing jointly with engineers  from the developed  country.
More challenging  arrangements,  with potentially  greater long-
term benefits,  include the establishment  of joint research  efforts
for  the  development  of competitive  applications  of renewable
sources  of energy.  One  arrangement  likely  to  prove  fruitful  in
this decade would involve cooperative  research and development
of photovoltaic solar cell technology.  This type of solar technol-
ogy  directly  converts energy  from the sun into electricity,  bypas-
sing  mechanical  conversion  processes.  As  a  result,  it  is  well-
suited  for  use  in  large  electricity  plants  as  well  as  small  water
pumps and rural communications  systems.' 9'  This technology  is
especially  promising for the electrification of the widely dispersed
villages  of many  developing countries,  where  systems  requiring
centralized  plants  and  a  matrix of extended  power  lines are  less
&esirable.' 92,  At  present,  photovoltaics  are  too  expensive  for
widespread  use,  but scientists  believe  that  advances  will  enable
costs  to be significantly reduced  by the end of the decade. 93
country  to another, is important  and valuable for a number of reasons beyond simply en-
suring the spread of technologies useful for environment  and development goals.  Indeed,
the IIEC's "model  country program"  approach  is designed to encourage developing coun-
tries to take advantage of this dynamic.  See INTERNATIONAL  INSTITUTE  FOR  ENERGY CONSER-
VATION,  MODEL  COUNTRY  PROJECT  TO  IMPLEMENT  ENERGY  EFFICIENCY  IN  THAILAND  I
(undated  and unpublished paper, available from IIEC,  Washington,  D.C.).
190.  See supra part IV(A)(4);  CONSERVATION  IN  ASIA, supra note  186;  CONSERVATION  IN
LATIN  AMERICA  AND  THE  CARIBBEAN,  supra  note  186.
191.  See Flavin &  Lenssen, supra note  116,  at  28.
192.  See id.  at 27  & Table 2-3;  GOLDEMBERG  ET  AL.,  supra note  21,  at 234.
193.  Flavin  &  Lenssen, supra note  116,  at  28.1992] Economics  and  the  Environment
Cooperative  endeavors  could  draw  upon  ongoing  efforts  and
resources  in both developing and developed  countries  to further
refine  these  technologies. 94   Such  joint  research  initiatives
should be structured  so  as  to emphasize  the facilitation  of long-
term local technological  capability, with the ultimate aim of estab-
lishing or  strengthening  the  developing country's  infrastructure
for research, development,  production, and distribution.195
From this description, it should be clear that, as in the debt-for-
nature  context,  the  proposed  exchanges  would  involve  a  fairly
complex  constellation  of  actors.  Technology-for-nature  ex-
changes would, however, also share the best feature of their debt-
for-nature  predecessors:  all of the  potential actors  stand to gain
from  the successful  conclusion of the arrangement.  Although  the
parties  to  technology-for-nature  exchanges  are  numerous,  the
close  interrelation of their goals should go a long way toward as-
suring the  cooperation  necessary  to  structure  and  execute  such
transactions.
D.  Legal Reforms
To some extent, technology-for-nature  exchanges could be un-
dertaken without legal reforms.  No statutory change is necessary
194.  Cooperative efforts  would also be fruitful with other renewable sources of energy
supply, particularly in light of the mutual benefits attainable  from  collaboration with those
developing countries  geographically  well-situated  for research  into technologies  that har-
ness a particular source of energy, such as wind energy.  These countries may already have
accumulated knowledge  and valuable experience for the development of a particular tech-
nology.  See  GOLDEMBERG  ET  AL.,  supra note  21,  at  384-89  (discussing  experience  in  the
development  of wind  power  in  various  locations,  including  the  State of Karnataka,  in
India).
195.  A recent initiative taken  by the IIEC in joint technology  development  of efficient,
CFC-free  refrigerators  for  manufacture  in India,  is illustrative  of an  approach  involving
collaboration  between  developed  and developing  countries  with the ultimate  goal of en-
hancing the developing country's  independence.  This example provides  a  model readily
adaptable to cooperative  efforts in  the development of renewable energy technology.  The
IIEC  is working on the  project with the New  Delhi-based Tata  Energy Research Institute
("TERI"),  which will  involve participants  from  the refrigerator  industry, research  institu-
tions, and governmental  agencies from  both the United  States and India.  The  IIEC  and
TERI  intend  to perform  oversight  functions  throughout  the  development  phase  of the
project, but to end their involvement when the project becomes commercially  viable.  This
exemplary  project  will thus  increase  Indian  experience  in  research  and  development  of
this  technology and result in the production and use in India  of an efficient, environmen-
tally sound  refrigerator.  See TATA  ENERGY  RESEARCH  INSTITUTE, supra note 189,  at  1-4.146  COLUMBIA JOURNAL  OF  ENVIRONMENTAL  LAW  [Vol.  17:93
to enable private parties to engage  in such arrangements. 96  The
requisite  participation  by  national  governments  may  be  author-
ized by existing  statutes.
There would be large advantages,  however,  in national and in-
ternational  legal  and  policy  reforms  designed  to  facilitate  these
exchanges.  At a minimum, this would require the elimination,  by
the  national  governments  of  both  developed  and  developing
countries,  of laws  and  policies  that  are  inhospitable  to  the  re-
search and development  of energy  efficiency  technology, and  to
the transfer  of that  technology.' 97  Government  intervention,  at
the least,  must not disturb  market  incentives  favoring conserva-
tion and innovation.  Toward  that objective,  pricing policies  for
the energy sector must be recrafted  so  that prices  accurately re-
flect the full costs of using energy - particularly that provided  by
fossil  fuels  - and  take  account  of  environmental  and  other
externalities. 98
Reforms might also include measures that more actively pursue
implementation of technology-for-nature  exchanges.  Recent  ini-
tiatives  at  the  domestic  level  are  extremely  promising.  The
Global  Environmental Protection Assistance Act of 1989,  for ex-
ample, instructs the United States representative  to the Develop-
ment  Assistance  Committee  of the  Organization  for  Economic
Cooperation  and  Development  ("OECD")  to  initiate  efforts  by
that body to  coordinate  approaches  to global  warming,  tropical
196.  As  experience in  the context  of debt-for-nature  exchanges has demonstrated,  it  is
indeed nongovernmental  organizations,  rather  than  governmental  entities,  that are likely
to pioneer endeavors  involving such novel  arrangements.  See supra part  III(A).
197.  For developed countries,  this could require the abandonment of policies  that skew
incentives for energy  research and development,  biasing them in favor of continued  fossil
fuel  dependence.  In the United  States, for example, $2.3  billion is slated for "clean  coal"
research  during  the next  five  years.  See  Flavin, supra note  27,  at  27.  Some developing
countries  might  consider  developing  or  strengthening  a  regime  protecting  intellectual
property, in order to facilitate some types of transfer of technology and to encourage local
innovation.  See Richard T.  Rapp & Richard  P. Rozek,  Benefits and  Costs of Intellectual Property
Protection in Developing Countries, 24 J.  WORLD  TRADE  75  (1990).
198.  See generally PACE  UNIVERSITY  CENTER  FOR  ENVIRONMENTAL  LEGAL  STUDIES,  ENVI-
RONMENTAL  COSTS  OF  ELECTRICITY  (1990).  For recent  suggestions  for including  environ-
mental costs  in accounting systems, see ERNST.LUTZ  & SALAH  EL  SERAFY,  ENVIRONMENTAL
AND  RESOURCE  ACCOUNTING:  AN  OVERVIEW  (World  Bank,  Environment  Department
Working  Paper No. 6,  1988);  HENRY M.  PESKIN,  ACCOUNTING  FOR  NATURAL  RESOURCE  DE-
PLETION  AND DEGRADATION  IN  DEVELOPING  COUNTRIES  (World Bank, Environment  Depart-
ment  Working  Paper  No.  13,  1989);  HENRY  M.  PESKIN  &  ERNST  LUTz,  A  SURVEY  OF
RESOURCE  AND  ENVIRONMENTAL  ACCOUNTING  IN  INDUSTRIALIZED  COUNTRIES  (World Bank,
Environment  Department Working Paper  No.  37,  1990).Economics  and  the Environment
deforestation,  sustainable  development,  and biological  diversity
through bilateral aid programs. 99  Among the goals of these pro-
grams  is  the "improved  exchange  of information  on energy  effi-
ciency  and  solar  and  renewable  energy  sources,  and  a  greater
emphasis  on  the  use  of  those  sources  in  development
projects." 200  To carry out this goal, the transfer of technology  to
developing  countriies  seems indispensable.
Legislation that specifically envisages  technology-for-nature  ex-
changes,  providing  for both initiatives  and  the  funding to  carry
them out, would be welcome.  Legislation of this sort could repli-
cate  the  provisions  of section  711  of the  Global  Environmental
Protection  Assistance  Act,20'  which  gives  such  authority,  in  the
context  of debt-for-nature  exchanges,  to the Agency for Interna-
tional Development  ("AID").  AID might similarly be empowered
to initiate  the transactions  necessary  for a technology-for-nature
exchange,  to  purchase  technology  from  industry  and  other
sources,  and to  undertake  negotiations  with  the  various  parties
involved,  including the developing country government. 2 0 2
At the international  level, there  is a  pressing need for coordi-
nated  measures  to  protect  against  environmental  degradation
while ensuring that such protection does not come at the expense
of economic growth.  To this  end, we mention here three points.
First, international legal instruments  must, by their terms, recog-
nize  the  interrelation  between  environmental  protection  and
global economic health.  Treaties and protocols  are an important
step, but to  date  they  have  been partial  and  ad hoc.2 0 3  We  ap-
plaud the recent recognition - by provision for and preparations
leading  to  the United  Nations  Conference  on Environment  and
199.  The Global Environmental  Protection Assistance Act of 1989 comprises  Title VII
of the International  Development and Finance Act of 1989,  Pub. L. No.  101-240,  §§  711,
721-22,  103  Stat. 2492, 2521-24  (codified at 22  U.S.C.  §§ 2281-86  (Supp. 1 1989)).
200.  Id. § 722(6),  103 Stat. at  2523-24.
201.  Id.  §  711,  103 Stat. at 2521-23  (codified at 22  U.S.C.  §§  2281-86  (Supp.  1 1989)).
202.  AID  was  suggested  as a promising candidate for orchestrating  such exchanges by
Howard  S. Geller,  the Executive Director of the American  Council for an Energy  Efficient
Economy,  in part because AID possesses some expertise gained from  past participation  in
energy efficiency  projects  in developing countries.  Telephone  interview  with Howard  S.
Geller (Jan. 24,  1991).
203.  For discussion of the successes and failures of recent efforts to address concerns of
environmental  protection  and  sustainable  development  through  international  conven-
tions, see Durwood Zaelke & James  Cameron,  Global Warming and Climate Change:  An Over-
view of the International Legal Process,  5  AM.  U. J.  INT'L  L.  &  POL'Y 249,  271-83  (1990);
Developments  in the Law-International  Environmental Law,  104  HARV.  L.  REV.  1484,  1521-79
(1991).
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Development20 4  - of the need to address developmental  exigen-
cies  if progress  in  worldwide  environmental  protection  is  to be
achieved.  International  agreements,  however, must also facilitate
the translation  of this  recognition  into  practice.  In light  of the
complexity  of the  underlying  causes  of  the  problem,  many  of
which  lie  outside of the  traditional  ambit  of intergovernmental
agreements  addressing environmental  concerns, accomplishment
of this task will require agreements that encourage and establish a
framework  for innovative international  cooperative  efforts.
Second, it would be extremely valuable  to position an interna-
tional entity,  perhaps  operating  through  the  United  Nations,  to
facilitate cooperation among developing and developed  countries
toward  the realization  of sustainability. 2 0 5  Such  an entity  might
be charged  with the missions of encouraging  appropriate energy
use in the pursuit of economic growth and environmental protec-
tion.  It  could  also  provide  a much needed  base for coordinating
the various projects  undertaken  by the diverse groups already  in-
volved in efforts in the interrelated  areas of energy, environment,
and  development. 206  An  important  function  of such  an  entity
would be the establishment  of standards for energy efficiency  and
technology  transfer.  The entity could operate as  a clearinghouse
for information on past and contemplated transactions,  and could
make recommendations  for long-term solutions.  Finally, such an
entity should be structured and located in such a way as to assure
maximum  accessibility  by  developing  countries.  To  this  end,  a
system  with  connected  regional  branches  seems  preferable  to  a
single centralized  bureau.
Third, mechanisms should be created to ensure that any agree-
ments,  whether  they  involve  debt  relief or  technology  transfer,
are enforceable.  At the very least, the relevant exchanges  should
probably be subject  to enforcement in  the national courts  of the
developing  country. This  approach  would  weaken  claims  about
204.  See  G.A.  Res.  228,  U.N.  GAOR,  44th  Sess.,  Supp.  No.  49,  at  151,  U.N.  Doc.
A/44/49 (1989).
205.  It is  not clear whether  the necessary responsibilities  ought to  be located in  an ex-
isting entity of the U.N. or an entirely new entity. Both options have advantages and disad-
vantages, and  we do  not take a position on their  relative merits.
206.  Under  the  auspices  of the  United  Nations  alone,  a  formidable  number  of pro-
grams,  specialized  agencies, and other entities share  responsibility  for economic  develop-
ment,  appropriate  energy  use, and  environmental  protection.  See  CALIFORNIA  INSTITUTE
OF PUBLIC  AFFAIRS,  WORLD  DIRECTORY  OF  ENVIRONMENTAL  ORGANIZATIONS  33-45  (Thad-
deus C. Trzyna  ed.,  3d ed.  1989).Economics  and the Environment
intrusions  on  sovereignty.  Alternatively,  arbitration  clauses  in
these agreements  might  allow enforcement  of any arbitral award
in any  country  that is  a party  to the United  Nations  Convention
on  Arbitration. 20 7  Finally,  the .coordinating entity  that we  have
proposed  might  be given monitoring and  adjudicative functions.
One  or more of these approaches  might be necessary  to resolve
problems  that will likely increase in magnitude with the prolifera-
tion of environmental  agreements.
V.  CONCLUSION
In the next generation, development in poor countries  presents
a  crucial challenge  for  environmental  law and  policy. Many  such
countries have little incentive to engage in environmental  protec-
tion at all.  All of them need assurance that the relevant programs
are designed  in a way that does not unduly compromise, and ide-
ally  promotes,  the  goals  of development  and political  and  eco-
nomic independence.
Central  to  the  realization  of sustainable  development  will  be
the employment,  on a worldwide  basis, of strategies for efficient
energy  use. To achieve  this  goal,  it  will  be  necessary  to  create
techniques  to  increase  the  efficiency  of existing  energy  sources
and  ultimately  to  convert  to new  sources  having  fewer  harmful
environmental consequences.  Both developing nations  and their
industrialized  counterparts should promote the development and
implementation  of the necessary  technology.
There  is  much  to  be  said  in  favor  of strategies  that  promote
environmental  protection  and economic  development  by reduc-
ing  the  debt  obligations  currently  burdening  many  developing
nations.  Suitably  structured,  debt-for-nature  trades  should  ac-
complish  considerable  good.  Standing  alone,  however,  these
strategies  do  far too  little  to  address  the  need  for efficient  and
alternative energy technology, which is the long-term prerequisite
for  the economic  and  ecological  stability  of developing nations.
To be sure, there is a pressing need  to alleviate the debt burdens
under which developing countries currently labor.  But economic
recovery and growth will also be hastened  by directing resources
toward  strategies  designed  to  put these  countries  on  the  long-
term path  to sustainability.  The channelling of funds  toward  in-
207.  Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,June
10,  1958,  21  U.S.T. 2517  (entered into force  Dec. 29,  1970).
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creasing  energy efficiency  will  thus be  an important  area for  in-
vesting  resources  over  the  next  decades.  New  technologies,
permitting the replacement of fossil fuels with clean and renewa-
ble sources of energy, are the ultimate goal of environmental  and
energy  policy in  developing and developed  nations  alike.
In  light of these  considerations,  we  have proposed  an entirely
new  kind  of  agreement:  the  technology-for-nature  exchange.
This exchange  has considerable  advantages  over its  debt-for-na-
ture  prototype.  Its  major  advantage  is  that it promises  to bring
about large-scale,  long-term reform and thus  to create structures
for encouraging not only lower  cost economic  development,  but
also the production of energy by means creating minimal damage
to  the  environment.  In  its  ideal  form,  it  will  also  advance  pro-
gress in energy efficiency, an area that is vital to sustainable devel-
opment.  In these ways,  a decision to trade technology for nature
holds  out  far  more  promise  than  previously  contemplated
strategies.
The proposed exchange  raises some serious economic and eth-
ical  questions,  and  it is  also  fairly complex.  For instance, devel-
oped countries  may well be under an ethical obligation to transfer
technology  to  developing  countries  for free  or at  significant  re-
ductions  in price.  This obligation  might be justified by reference
to  general  redistributive  goals,  environmental  concerns,  or  the
view that industrialized  countries  have profited  from technologi-
cal development producing environmental harms, that such coun-
tries  benefit  from  environmental  protection  in  developing
countries,  and  that  developing  countries  should  not  be  placed
under  special  economic  disabilities  because  of  environmental
damage  caused  by others.  These considerations  suggest  that  at
least a heavily discounted transfer of technology may be an ethical
obligation  of developed  countries.  Whether  or not this  is  so,  a
transfer of technology for nature seems to hold out considerable
promise.
A transfer of technology for nature requires  the cooperation of
several  parties,  all  of whom  wish  to  advance  different  agendas.
The arrangement  we  propose should serve  the  interests of each
party,  and  the  resulting  advances  in  combatting  global  environ-
mental  and  developmental  problems  should  benefit  all  con-
cerned.  To  some  extent  such  transactions  could  occur  without
legal  changes, but international  and  domestic  law could  both be
harnessed  to  facilitate  the  process.  Technology-for-nature  ex-1992]  Economics  and  the Environment  151
changes  could contribute  enormously to resolution of the closely
linked  problems  of  environmental  protection  and  economic
development.